Defeating illiberals is not the same as defeating illiberalism
Electoral defeats of illiberal forces offer renewed hope for liberal democracy. But electoral victories are different from democratic renewal. The damage inflicted by illiberalism outlasts governments, and complacency risks opening the door to their return.
The defeat of Aleksandar Vučić, following Viktor Orbán’s in April, alongside the prospect of a major setback for Trump in the US midterm elections, are giving supporters of liberal democracy hope. Rightly so.
They demonstrate that incumbent illiberals and autocrats are not invincible. Even when they have captured state institutions, undermined democratic checks and balances and manipulated the political playing field, they can be defeated. This matters enormously. Those defending liberal democracy must believe they have agency, that political mobilisation makes a difference and that the fight is not yet lost.
But hope must not become complacency.
Volatility, polarisation and dissatisfaction are now structural features of democratic politics. Electoral victories are increasingly temporary; political fortunes shift rapidly. Neither side can expect comprehensive or permanent victory.
Defeating an incumbent is not necessarily an endorsement of the alternative. Corruption, nepotism, state capture and the arrogance of power can generate opposition. But voters are often dissatisfied with the entire political establishment. Today’s victors can become tomorrow’s targets, especially once the inevitable compromises and disappointments of governing become apparent.
Illiberal forces understand this. They are not necessarily defeated when they lose power. They regroup, invest in political and institutional networks, exploit discontent and prepare their return. They show considerable patience and determination in pursuing their objectives, including from opposition.
The real danger is what illiberals destroy.
Illiberalism is not just another political programme that can be reversed following an election. Its fundamental objective is to dismantle the institutional, political and societal constraints on the exercise of power. Independent courts, free media, civil society, public administration, academic freedom and the norms of democratic competition are all targets.
Once undermined, these foundations are extraordinarily difficult to rebuild. Institutional independence cannot simply be restored by changing leaders. Public trust, democratic norms and a culture of tolerance take years, sometimes generations, to establish, but can be destroyed far more quickly.
Nor does electoral defeat reverse institutional capture, entrenched corruption or normalised authoritarian practices. Illiberal networks can remain embedded in the state, economy and society, exercising influence long after their leaders are gone.
This creates a fundamental asymmetry. Illiberals can destroy democratic safeguards far more rapidly than democrats can reconstruct them. Each period of illiberal rule weakens the democratic fabric further, making the next assault easier and recovery harder.
Winning elections is necessary but insufficient.
Electoral victories are not evidence that the illiberal tide has decisively turned. There will be further setbacks. Democracy cannot depend on illiberals remaining unpopular.
Instead, electoral success is an opportunity for democratic reconstruction: restoring institutional independence, strengthening the rule of law, tackling corruption and state capture, protecting civic space and rebuilding public trust.
It also must deliver tangible improvements in people’s lives. Without effective governance and economic and social progress, the dissatisfaction on which illiberal forces thrive persists. Democratic resilience requires sustained political investment, not simply defensive mobilisation when democracy is threatened.
The recent defeats of illiberal leaders should be celebrated. They demonstrate that democratic resistance works and political agency matters. But they also serve as a warning against premature triumphalism.
Winning a battle is not winning the war. Liberal democracy has gained breathing space, not secured its future. This is the moment to redouble efforts, not relax them.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
