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"I want to address three basic questions concerning Britain’s relationship with Europe:
Why did Britain join the EU?
What were the considerations that led British politicians in the 1960s to decide that membership of the European Community (EC; now the EU) was desirable? It was a realisation that the structures of economic and political integration created by the Six were operating successfully and would lead to common action and common policies. So Britain as a non-member would be without a voice or a vote in the collective decisions of its main European neighbours.
For British politicians, it was a case of pragmatism, not ideology. The decision to join followed from the maxim ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. Alec Douglas-Home, Britain’s Foreign Secretary and former Prime Minister, explained to the House of Commons in 1971 that “the only way to preserve our independence for the future is to join a larger grouping. It may seem paradoxical, but I believe it to be true”.
Today these arguments are not less valid: they are stronger.
If you are not at the table, your point of view will not be taken into account; and decisions taken without you may go against your interests. This can be expressed more brutally: ‘if you are not at the table, you will be on the menu’.
What would be Britain’s options outside the EU?
A European state can remain outside the EU and function well: the classic examples are Norway and Switzerland.
Norway, together with Iceland and Liechtenstein, is in the European Economic Area (EEA), which gives access to the EU’s Single Market and other common policies, accompanied by exemption from most of the EU’s agricultural policy and fisheries policy. The EEA is the closest form of relationship that the EU has ever made with neighbours.
But it has a price – both budgetary and political. Norway pays an annual fee to the EU budget. Under the EEA, many laws decided by the EU are directly applicable in Norway. A recent report to Norway’s government said, “the most problematic aspect of our association with the EU is the fact that Norway is in practice bound to adopt EU policies and rules on a broad range of issues without being a member and without voting rights. This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making processes that have direct consequences for Norway, and neither do we have any significant influence on them”.
If Britain were to leave the EU, it would need to develop another relationship with the EU, and it is often suggested that the default mode would be the EEA. This may be acceptable for Norway – a small country of five million people – but would it be acceptable for Britain, a bigger country with a different history and a different concept of its international role?
Switzerland is not in the EEA, but has a series of bilateral agreements with the EU.
There is an increasing desire on the EU side to make that system more automatic – in fact, more like the EEA. Although Switzerland is an important economic partner (the EU’s second biggest partner after the USA), it has come to realise that in practice it has little choice but to adopt EU laws and standards in many areas, even for taxation and banking. Would this be an acceptable option for Britain?
Is a new kind of EU membership possible for Britain?
For some British politicians the preferred solution is to reconfigure the terms of Britain’s EU membership so that it retains the economic benefits but avoids the political integration: ‘keep the Single Market, drop the political nonsense’.
According to Prime Minister David Cameron, “it is vital for our country [...] that we get our relationship with Europe right. As a trading nation, Britain needs unfettered access to European markets and a say in how the rules of that market are written [...] The problem with an in/out referendum is that it offers a single choice, whereas what I want [...] is to make changes to our relationship [...] Far from there being too little Europe, there is too much of it. Too much cost; too much bureaucracy; too much meddling in issues that belong to nation states or civic society or individuals. Whole swathes of legislation covering social issues, working time and home affairs should, in my view, be scrapped [...] The single currency is driving a process that will see its members take more and more steps towards fuller integration. They are necessary if the euro is to survive, but mean that the EU and relationships within it will change. We have shown not only that we can stay out of that integration, but that we can also get out of things [...] that we don’t like. There is more to come where we can take forward our interests, safeguard the single market and stay out of a federal Europe” (interview in The Daily Telegraph, 30/06/2012).
Mr Cameron’s plan is to exploit negotiations on the future of the euro not only to stay out of integration, but also to obtain opt-outs from other EU policies. The result would be presented to the British people in a referendum, in which the question would be ‘do you approve the new relationship which the government has negotiated with the EU?’ That would not satisfy politicians who wish to leave the EU, but it could obtain a ‘yes’ from the public.
But can Britain obtain a new relationship of this kind, and would it be sustainable?
On the question of whether it is possible, we have to wait and see. No-one knows what the British government will demand, or how other EU members will react. On the basis of the experience in December 2011, when Mr Cameron applied a ‘veto’ but obtained nothing, the prospects are not good. On that occasion, the others refused to compensate Britain for ratifying an agreement that imposed no new obligations on it. As one diplomat remarked, “we would have liked you British to join with us in modifying the Treaty, but we didn’t see why we should pay you for it”.
Let us suppose, however, that Britain does obtain a new relationship with the EU: would the situation be stable? In my view, it would lead to more disputes and disappointments. Britain will find itself more in the ‘outer circle’ than it is now. The members of the ‘inner circle’ will take more decisions among themselves, with direct and indirect consequences for Britain – sometimes negative. The British will be increasingly frustrated and resentful. Sooner or later there will be a major crisis, perhaps over budgetary affairs, leading to a realisation that life in the outer circle is intolerable, and a decision to leave the EU.
This, alas, is likely to be the unintended consequence of the trajectory on which the present British government is engaged."
Graham Avery is a Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre, a Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and an Honorary Director-General of the European Commission.
- Why did it join the EU?
- What would be its options outside the EU?
- Can it negotiate a new kind of EU membership?
Why did Britain join the EU?
What were the considerations that led British politicians in the 1960s to decide that membership of the European Community (EC; now the EU) was desirable? It was a realisation that the structures of economic and political integration created by the Six were operating successfully and would lead to common action and common policies. So Britain as a non-member would be without a voice or a vote in the collective decisions of its main European neighbours.
For British politicians, it was a case of pragmatism, not ideology. The decision to join followed from the maxim ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. Alec Douglas-Home, Britain’s Foreign Secretary and former Prime Minister, explained to the House of Commons in 1971 that “the only way to preserve our independence for the future is to join a larger grouping. It may seem paradoxical, but I believe it to be true”.
Today these arguments are not less valid: they are stronger.
If you are not at the table, your point of view will not be taken into account; and decisions taken without you may go against your interests. This can be expressed more brutally: ‘if you are not at the table, you will be on the menu’.
What would be Britain’s options outside the EU?
A European state can remain outside the EU and function well: the classic examples are Norway and Switzerland.
Norway, together with Iceland and Liechtenstein, is in the European Economic Area (EEA), which gives access to the EU’s Single Market and other common policies, accompanied by exemption from most of the EU’s agricultural policy and fisheries policy. The EEA is the closest form of relationship that the EU has ever made with neighbours.
But it has a price – both budgetary and political. Norway pays an annual fee to the EU budget. Under the EEA, many laws decided by the EU are directly applicable in Norway. A recent report to Norway’s government said, “the most problematic aspect of our association with the EU is the fact that Norway is in practice bound to adopt EU policies and rules on a broad range of issues without being a member and without voting rights. This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making processes that have direct consequences for Norway, and neither do we have any significant influence on them”.
If Britain were to leave the EU, it would need to develop another relationship with the EU, and it is often suggested that the default mode would be the EEA. This may be acceptable for Norway – a small country of five million people – but would it be acceptable for Britain, a bigger country with a different history and a different concept of its international role?
Switzerland is not in the EEA, but has a series of bilateral agreements with the EU.
There is an increasing desire on the EU side to make that system more automatic – in fact, more like the EEA. Although Switzerland is an important economic partner (the EU’s second biggest partner after the USA), it has come to realise that in practice it has little choice but to adopt EU laws and standards in many areas, even for taxation and banking. Would this be an acceptable option for Britain?
Is a new kind of EU membership possible for Britain?
For some British politicians the preferred solution is to reconfigure the terms of Britain’s EU membership so that it retains the economic benefits but avoids the political integration: ‘keep the Single Market, drop the political nonsense’.
According to Prime Minister David Cameron, “it is vital for our country [...] that we get our relationship with Europe right. As a trading nation, Britain needs unfettered access to European markets and a say in how the rules of that market are written [...] The problem with an in/out referendum is that it offers a single choice, whereas what I want [...] is to make changes to our relationship [...] Far from there being too little Europe, there is too much of it. Too much cost; too much bureaucracy; too much meddling in issues that belong to nation states or civic society or individuals. Whole swathes of legislation covering social issues, working time and home affairs should, in my view, be scrapped [...] The single currency is driving a process that will see its members take more and more steps towards fuller integration. They are necessary if the euro is to survive, but mean that the EU and relationships within it will change. We have shown not only that we can stay out of that integration, but that we can also get out of things [...] that we don’t like. There is more to come where we can take forward our interests, safeguard the single market and stay out of a federal Europe” (interview in The Daily Telegraph, 30/06/2012).
Mr Cameron’s plan is to exploit negotiations on the future of the euro not only to stay out of integration, but also to obtain opt-outs from other EU policies. The result would be presented to the British people in a referendum, in which the question would be ‘do you approve the new relationship which the government has negotiated with the EU?’ That would not satisfy politicians who wish to leave the EU, but it could obtain a ‘yes’ from the public.
But can Britain obtain a new relationship of this kind, and would it be sustainable?
On the question of whether it is possible, we have to wait and see. No-one knows what the British government will demand, or how other EU members will react. On the basis of the experience in December 2011, when Mr Cameron applied a ‘veto’ but obtained nothing, the prospects are not good. On that occasion, the others refused to compensate Britain for ratifying an agreement that imposed no new obligations on it. As one diplomat remarked, “we would have liked you British to join with us in modifying the Treaty, but we didn’t see why we should pay you for it”.
Let us suppose, however, that Britain does obtain a new relationship with the EU: would the situation be stable? In my view, it would lead to more disputes and disappointments. Britain will find itself more in the ‘outer circle’ than it is now. The members of the ‘inner circle’ will take more decisions among themselves, with direct and indirect consequences for Britain – sometimes negative. The British will be increasingly frustrated and resentful. Sooner or later there will be a major crisis, perhaps over budgetary affairs, leading to a realisation that life in the outer circle is intolerable, and a decision to leave the EU.
This, alas, is likely to be the unintended consequence of the trajectory on which the present British government is engaged."
Graham Avery is a Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre, a Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and an Honorary Director-General of the European Commission.
