A harsh reality check for the EU

Mar 17, 2008
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This analysis concludes that European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s claim that the EU had passed a “reality test” is premature. It also highlights the growing role given to the Commission in finding solutions to thorny issues which EU leaders cannot agree on.


What a difference a year makes. The 2007 Spring European Council ended with a bang when the 27 Heads of State and Government solemnly unveiled the new Energy Policy for Europe, including the famous “triple 20” formula for achieving a set of targets by 2020. One year on, the 13-14 March 2008 Summit was confronted with a harsh reality check: getting down to the nitty-gritty of how to meet those targets and share out the burden between the 27 Member Statesis (predictably) proving a much more difficult exercise.

On top of that, the changed economic situation both worldwide and within the EU (the aftershocks of the sub prime crisis in the US, the persistent fall of the dollar and rise of the euro, the soaring price of oil and strong inflationary pressures in Europe) is having an impact on growth forecasts and triggering defensive reactions inside the Union, which came to the fore during the European Council.

At the end of the Summit, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said that the EU had “passed a reality test”. In fact, the jury is still out, as the EU-27 committed themselves to finalising the relevant legislation within a year – a pledge which will require, among other things, strong coordination and synergy between all the EU institutions (including the European Parliament).

What is clear is that the Union is now torn between two opposite pressures. On the one hand, it must deliver on its ‘green’ promises and set an example to the rest of the world, if it wants to preserve its credibility and prepare the ground for a comprehensive global deal on cutting emissions at the United Nations Conference on climate change in Copenhagen in late 2009.

On the other, although Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa insisted that “the costs of these measures will be much lower than if we do not act”, the worsening economic situation is strengthening the hand of those who worry about a loss of competitiveness for certain sectors of European industry vis-à-vis less environmentally minded and legally constrained non-EU producers.

Herein lies a potential pitfall for Europe’s ambition and commitment to ‘lead by example’ in the fight against greenhouse gases – but it should not undermine the common determination to manage the transition to a “safe and sustainable low carbon economy”, as reaffirmed in the Presidency Conclusions.

In this respect, the most contentious point of the whole European Council was the exact wording of paragraph 19 (and to a lesser extent 20) of the Conclusions on ‘carbon leakage’ (the risk that companies will simply move to other countries to avoid strict CO2 emissions limits within the Union) and the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).

This was debated at length in COREPER (the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives) before the Summit and underwent various drafts during the meeting, moving from more generic formulations to a final version which explicitly mentions: a) the sectors involved (“energy-intensive industries”); b) the legislative instrument concerned (“the new ETS Directive”); and c) the possible operational goal (taking “appropriate measures” if international negotiations fail).

What can be read between the lines and behind the official language is a surge of ‘green protectionism’ – as The Economist put it some time ago – as advocated by the steel and aluminium sectors, which argue that the relocation of production to countries with cheap labour would be both environmentally damaging worldwide (resulting in higher carbon emissions due to lower standards and controls) and socio-economically penalising within Europe.

It remains to be seen, however, whether this will actually translate into concrete ‘defensive’ measures by the EU or is just a temporary ploy meant to assuage the fears of specific sectors of European industry – mostly located in core districts along the River Rhine.

As for the rest of the climate ‘package’, the Presidency Conclusions insist on:

  • the need for “flexibility in achieving national non-ETS and renewable targets” (another signal of Members States’ rising concerns);
  • keeping to the timetable for a political agreement on the third internal market package for gas and electricity (by this June);
  • asking the Commission to examine “areas where economic instruments, including VAT rates”, can contribute to increasing the use of “energy-efficient goods and energy-saving materials”; 
  • the need for “further developing the external dimension” of energy policy.

Indeed, the leaders of the EU-27 had a long informal discussion on energy security, security of supply and external relations over dinner on Thursday – further evidence of the sensitivity and relevance of this issue for all the Member States.

In the same vein, the European Council welcomed the joint report from EU High Representative Javier Solana and the Commission on the impact of climate change on international security.

The document constitutes a remarkable analysis of the possible consequences of global warming and climate instability as drivers of increased competition for (or even conflict over) scarce resources such as water; destabilisation in fragile and ill-governed countries and regions; and growing migratory pressures on a global scale. While climate change is unlikely to affect the European continent as such severely, in the short term at least it can be regarded – as the Report puts it – as a “threat multiplier” worldwide, potentially capable of reshaping the international system.

The Presidency Conclusions invite “the Council to examine the paper and to submit recommendations on appropriate follow-up action, in particular on how to intensify cooperation with third countries and regions”. It is also likely that the document will feed into the report that Mr Solana is due to present to the European Council this December on the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy.

From Lisbon to the Mediterranean

The Summit also launched, as expected, the second three-year cycle of the renewed Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs (2008-2010). The Presidency Conclusions include nine pages (out of 18 overall) devoted to the objectives of the Strategy by putting special emphasis on the 3% Research and Development (R&D) investment target, the further development of the “e-Single Market”, and the creation of a “fifth freedom” – namely, the free movement of knowledge, based on enhancing and facilitating the cross-border mobility of researchers and the optimal use of intellectual property, implementing education reforms and promoting the mutual recognition of qualifications.

The main question mark hovering over the Strategy’s various, well-crafted, goals remains the same as before: namely, that their implementation is left almost entirely at the discretion of individual Member States. Normally, those governments which are already convinced of the merits of reform and modernisation and have a constituency they can rely on to achieve this act accordingly, while the others do not – regardless of the content of the Lisbon Strategy.

In fact, peer review and best practice - the so-called “open method of coordination” that underpins the Strategy - often succumb to more pressing domestic priorities, and the lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms risks rendering its numerous recommendations a dead letter. Still, Lisbon II represents a well-articulated catalogue of measures to aim at and converge upon – and a shared commitment against which to measure the consistency of Member States’ behaviour, especially at a time of growing uncertainty over the prospects for the global economy.  

Interestingly, the Summit also addressed the issue of “the stability of financial markets” and the persistent fragility of the international system following the turmoil which began last autumn. The Presidency Conclusions stress that “while the primary responsibility is with the private sector, authorities in the EU” [starting with the European Central Bank] “stand ready to take regulatory and supervisory action where necessary”.

Particular emphasis is placed on a number of marginal improvements to be made on transparency, evaluation, monitoring, and especially the tools and procedures for managing cross-border financial crisis situations – with a view to signing a new Memorandum of Understanding to this effect this spring.

On Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), moreover, the Conclusions “welcome” a recent Commission Communication, but do not go much beyond a series of broad considerations and desirable but hardly enforceable, proposals such as a “voluntary code of conduct for SWFs”. In fact, the complexity of this phenomenon and the controversial nature of what is to be done (or not) in this domain do not leave much room for specific action to be undertaken at the EU level.

Last but certainly not least, the European Council approved “the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean which will include the Member States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states” and invited the Commission to present proposals to the Council for defining “the modalities of what will be called the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’” before the relevant Summit scheduled for 13 July in Paris.

The saga which was opened last spring by newly-elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy with his vague idea of creating a “Mediterranean Union” has come to a temporary halt. In response to German demands in particular, the initiative has now been brought within the fold of existing EU policies, starting with the Barcelona Process - as its new name underlines - and (on the budgetary side) the European Neighbourhood Policy. In other words, President Sarkozy has had to accept a significant ‘EU-isation’ of his original plan, which was as ill-defined as it was ambivalent, thus raising suspicions right across the EU and in the Mediterranean region itself.

The fact that the Commission has been tasked with coming up with proposals for its implementation represents a guarantee for everyone at this stage, although it does not solve the basic question about the precise scope of the new initiative. It is also worth stressing that a Franco-German compromise reached on the eve of the Summit after months of bilateral tensions over Sarkozy’s “Mediterranean Union” was not fully embraced by the European Council: Spain and Greece have, for instance, announced their own proposals in this respect. It is now likely that the June Summit will revisit the issue before handing it over to the French EU Presidency in July.

Old and new players

The Commission’s role at this Summit, in particular, deserves further attention. Be it the Mediterranean Union dispute, the controversy over ‘appropriate’ defensive measures for energy-intensive industries, or the call for a change to the VAT regime for environmentally-friendly appliances, the Commission is increasingly called upon by the European Council to act, not as a referee, but rather as a relatively independent but controllable authority to resort to for a temporary ‘time out’ and a source of additional ideas to address a thorny problem – although a final decision on the solution is to remain the EU-27 leaders’ prerogative. This is a noteworthy development, especially a year before the end of the current College’s mandate.

Such a role is sometimes welcomed by the Commission (certainly in the case of the Union for the Mediterranean), and sometimes not (for example, the discussion over special VAT regimes). However, it puts the institution in a tricky position, in which it has to try to exploit the limited margins of initiative and innovation at its disposal to the maximum while navigating the troubled waters of a 27-strong club of strictly sovereignty-minded Heads of State and Government. This trend began exactly one year ago, incidentally, when the Commission was tasked with presenting proposals for implementing the highly ambitious Energy Policy for Europe, but it has definitely been reinforced now – and is a quintessentially double-edged development.

For its part, the Slovenian Presidency appears to have fared reasonably well in the first half of its first-ever mandate at the EU helm. Well supported by the Commission on the work related to Lisbon II and energy policy, it has kept a relatively low profile on the most controversial topics. Even on the almost intractable issue of Kosovo, it has managed to steer a potentially divided Union clear of an open crisis and keep it focused on the practical imperatives of the moment. This is no minor achievement, although much remains to be done.

Finally, on a more personal note, this was the last EU Summit for outgoing Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and Belgium’s Guy Verhofstadt, two of the most senior members of the club and often portrayed as the last remaining unrepentant federalists among the EU leaders. Mr Verhofstadt is due to hand over the reins of the Belgian government to Yves Leterme within days, but has pledged to be back on the EU stage for next year’s European Parliament elections. Mr Prodi has announced his retirement from active politics, but not everyone believes it.

Meanwhile, it remains to be seen what lessons the newest star in the EU firmament, Nicolas Sarkozy, will draw from the Summit discussions. The arguments over his “Mediterranean Union” – and the much-watered down initiative which emerged from the European Council - are a cautionary tale that, in the words of the Rolling Stones’ famous song, “You can’t always get what you want”, no matter how forcefully you put your case. He has just three short months to consider what implications that might have for his eagerly-anticipated six months in charge of EU business, when his country will have to forge (rather than force) deals among its European partners.




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