Between Prague and Copenhagen

Nov 02, 2009
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This analysis concludes that the Summit delivered results on the first two, although perhaps inevitably limited in the case of the EU’s common position on climate change, and that the parameters for choosing the first holders of the two new posts are now clearer.


It was a tale of two Summits: the formal agenda was dominated, once again, by the fate of the Lisbon Treaty and by the forthcoming international climate change conference, and the informal one by intense discussions which took place in the margins on who should be appointed to the key posts created by the Lisbon Treaty.

The European Council of 29-30 October focused on two main points: how to deal with the additional condition set by Czech President Vaclav Klaus for putting his signature to the Lisbon Treaty, and how to formulate the EU’s negotiating position (and related commitments) for the United Nations Conference on climate change in Copenhagen in December. Other issues - such as the establishment of a new EU financial supervisory structure and immigration policy - were dealt with only in passing, with decisions to be taken at the next routine EU Summit in seven weeks’ time.

The evening of 29 October was entirely devoted to addressing the Czech demand in a way that would not reopen the ratification process for the other 26 Member States or trigger new requests from other countries. In the end, EU leaders agreed to avoid mentioning the specific issue raised by President Klaus (an exemption from possible retroactive property claims made by the so-called Sudetendeutschen, the ethnic German community expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II under the famous ‘Benes decrees’) - which could have in turn sparked a similar request from Slovakia and possibly opposition from Hungary (as Magyars were also hit by the 1948 decrees). They decided instead to grant Prague a full ‘opt-out’ from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is an integral part of the Lisbon Treaty.

The European Council pledged to do this - following the example adopted with the Irish ‘guarantees’ last June - “at the time of the conclusion of the next Accession Treaty”. A dedicated one-page Protocol to this effect, which simply adds the Czech Republic to the exemption already negotiated in 2007 by the UK and Poland, was thus annexed to the Presidency Conclusions.

Finally, a couple of explanatory paragraphs concerning the judicial scope of the Charter and the principle of subsidiarity were added in order to assuage Slovakia’s concerns.

The final countdown begins

The deal on the Czech opt-out, however half-heartedly or grudgingly accepted by most Member States, is widely seen as the (almost) final chapter in the Lisbon Treaty saga. If the Czech Constitutional Court rules that Lisbon is compatible with the Czech Constitution (its verdict is expected on 3 November), it would be very difficult for President Klaus to delay signing any further.

In this event, the Swedish Presidency is preparing to convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to take the legal steps and political decisions required to implement the new Treaty, with a view to seeing it “enter into force by the end of 2009”.

Initially planned for 11 or 12 November, such an extraordinary Summit now seems likely to take place on the 19, to give the Presidency time to carry out the necessary consultations among the 27 over the appointment of the new institutional figures foreseen by the Treaty and allow European Commission President-elect José Manuel Barroso to shape his new College accordingly.

The latter is now virtually certain to include - apart from President Barroso himself - 25 Commissioners plus the new double-hatted High Representative for CFSP and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), in line with the Lisbon provisions.

However, President Barroso will not be in a position to announce his new team until the HR/VP has been chosen by the European Council (in consultation with him), as the country which gets this post will not have a Commissioner ‘proper’. Hence the priority is to select first the new President of the European Council (for two and a half years, with a possibility of a second term of equal duration) and the HR/VP, in order to have the new Lisbon-based institutional set-up completed by late 2009.

In a way, these appointments were the ‘elephant in the room’ throughout the European Council meeting. On the one hand, there was no discussion of the ‘EU top jobs’ - as they are now commonly referred to in the media - at the Summit proper, as the Treaty is not yet in place. On the other, it was the main topic of conversation in many of the informal talks between leaders (including in the ‘party group’ meetings that normally precede such European Councils) and largely dominated the media coverage, with frenzied speculation about alleged front-runners and potential dark horses.

National spin and occasional manipulation apart, this demonstrated how much attention the choice of personalities to represent the EU can attract not only among policy-makers and pundits but also among the wider public - in Europe and beyond.

As a consequence, in making their final choice, the leaders of the EU-27 will have to strike a credible balance between expectations and needs. The discussion in (and by) the media has at least contributed to clarifying a little better what is expected of the holders of either job and what type of personality should get them. It also revealed what (and whom) seems capable (or not) of gathering sufficient consensus. Some progress was also made on the job ‘profile’ and, arguably, the political ‘colour’ of the holder of each post.

For a European Council where more than two-thirds of the governments are centre-right, it would in fact appear odd to appoint a President who is not politically compatible with the majority. For a Commission that, for the same reason, will probably have a predominantly centre-right College, the opposite reasoning could apply: precisely because, as an institution, it represents the entire Union and all its citizens and should therefore rely on wide support and legitimacy (including in/from the European Parliament), its de facto No. 2 - the HR/VP - could well be chosen from the centre-left camp (indeed, the Party of European Socialists seems to have formulated its preference with this in mind).

Finally, EU leaders are expected to aim for a degree of geographical (and possibly also gender) balance, taking into account not only the fact that the first two ‘EU top jobs’ of 2009 have been given to South-Western and Central-Eastern leaders (Barroso and European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek), but also that other top jobs in Europe and worldwide are currently held mostly by Frenchmen and Scandinavians - namely at the European Central Bank, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, NATO and the Council of Europe.

However, EU leaders will also have to be able to defend their final choice in its own right - not just as the optimal outcome of convoluted trade-offs among 27 different national interests. The entire world will look at the personalities who will form the new ‘triad’ at the EU helm in the years to come. This does not mean that global notoriety should be an indispensable criterion: one can be known for all the wrong reasons, and the EU may need new fresh faces that can establish themselves over time. On top of that, the implementation of the Treaty will have to be handled with care by all, as there is undoubtedly potential for frictions, turf battles and dysfunctional solutions.

Needless to say, much will also depend on the way in which each member of the new ‘triad’ - which turns into a ‘quad’ or even a ‘quint’ if one also includes the European Parliament and the rotating Council Presidency - will interpret his/her role and function in the new system created by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as on the resources made available to perform their respective roles.

Interestingly, the European Council approved a Presidency Report - agreed in COREPER a few days before the Summit - on the European External Action Service (EEAS) that is to “support” the HR/VP. The new Treaty stipulates that the set-up of the EEAS be discussed ahead of its legal entry into force in order to have it in place as soon as possible thereafter. The Swedish Presidency Report sets some “guidelines” to that end, particularly regarding the start-up phase, but is not considered strictly binding for the future HR/VP, who will at any rate have to submit a specific proposal to the relevant EU institutions “with a view to its adoption by the Council at the latest by the end of April 2010”.

Yet the issues related to the initial creation and further development of the EEAS lie at the heart of the inter-institutional debate over who should ‘do’ foreign policy in the EU and raise crucial questions about legal status, functional scope, and budgetary underpinning. After all, the EEAS represents a major innovation with (hopefully) long-lasting effects. Although everything cannot be addressed and solved in a few weeks (or even months), the initial steps will provide some clues to the future direction of the EU’s ‘foreign service’ - and will therefore be worth monitoring.

A changing climate in Brussels?

The other major discussion at the European Council was on what common position the EU should adopt for the final preparatory stages for the international climate conference in Copenhagen. On this issue, two main cleavages emerged among the EU-27.

The first was primarily (though not exclusively) of a tactical nature and revolved around whether it was preferable, at this stage, to mention specific figures on the EU’s possible share of the global funding needed to help the world’s least developed countries tackle climate change. The Commission, the Swedish Presidency, the Nordic countries and the UK argued that it was, while Germany led the opposite camp, which is generally more reluctant to make specific commitments without a clearer idea first of how much others (starting with the US) are ready to put on the table.

In the end, the Summit agreed on a formulation that accepts the Commission’s estimate that “the total net incremental costs of mitigation and adaptation in developing countries could amount to around EUR 100 billion annually by 2020, to be met through a combination of their own efforts, the international carbon market, and international public finance”. The overall level of the latter, in

particular, is calculated “to lie in the range of EUR 22 to 50 billion per year by 2020, subject to a fair burden sharing at the global level in line with the distribution key to be agreed […]”.

Furthermore, the Summit took “note of the Commission estimate that a global financing of EUR 5-7 billion per year for the first three years is needed” in the event of an “ambitious” agreement in Copenhagen - but stressed that a precise “figure will be determined in light of the outcome” of the conference.

For their part, the EU and its Member States “are ready to contribute their fair share of these costs […] conditional on other key players making comparable efforts”, according to the Presidency Conclusions. EU leaders also agreed informally that this “fair share” would amount to roughly one-third of the total, with the US hopefully covering an equal amount (the issue is to be addressed on 3 November at the EU-US Summit in Washington). In turn, Germany alone is expected to put up at least 20% of the EU’s overall contribution, which may help explain Berlin’s attitude at the Summit.

In the fast-start phase, at any rate, the Conclusions state that the EU would be ready to live up to its commitments on a “voluntary basis”. As Sweden’s Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt explained at the final press conference, this means that there is no obligation for anyone to contribute between 2010-12 (i.e. until the Kyoto Protocol expires), although some Member States are already willing to advance a significant chunk of the foreseeable sum.

In fact, the controversy over the ‘fast-start’ allocations delayed the end of the Summit on the 30th and was resolved only with the compromise on their “voluntary” nature, which - alongside the decision not to mention any specific figure for global burden-sharing - has sparked criticism from environmental organisations and cast doubts on the Union’s determination to “be at the forefront of efforts to fight climate change”.

It must, however, be acknowledged that, compared to a few months ago, the overall context has somewhat changed - and for the worse.

Many European countries are now running excessive deficits and facing spiralling public debt, with tax revenues falling and unemployment rising. Meanwhile, US legislation on cap-and-trade is stuck in Congress and is unlikely to be approved before Copenhagen, thus making it more problematic for EU governments to commit to specific figures at this stage. Still, Prime Minister Reinfeldt was probably right in saying that the EU remains in “a strong negotiating position” in the run-up to Copenhagen, and President Barroso in stating that the outcome of the Summit was “much better than expected seven days ago”.

After all, all the ambitious headline targets for reducing CO2 emissions at the regional - and global - level have once again been reiterated, including the EU’s quest for “a legally binding agreement for the period starting 1 January 2013”. As freshly re-elected German Chancellor Angela Merkel put it at the Summit, “we have only become more realistic” about the expected outcome of Copenhagen - which may now be limited, at best, to establishing a new political framework - and the need for more negotiations in 2010 and beyond.

Perhaps more worrying was the second cleavage that emerged at the European Council, namely the rebellion against EU internal burden-sharing led by a group of new Member States. This rebellion, prepared on the eve of the Summit at a separate informal meeting of nine countries, was publicly articulated by the Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers, who took issue with the idea that the poorer EU countries (whose economies are also still quite carbon-dependent) should pay for Brazil or India’s climate change measures - and, as they saw it, disproportionately so.

Finally, EU leaders are expected to aim for a degree of geographical (and possibly also gender) balance, taking into account not only the fact that the first two ‘EU top jobs’ of 2009 have been given to South-Western and Central-Eastern leaders (Barroso and European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek), but also that other top jobs in Europe and worldwide are currently held mostly by Frenchmen and Scandinavians - namely at the European Central Bank, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, NATO and the Council of Europe.

However, EU leaders will also have to be able to defend their final choice in its own right - not just as the optimal outcome of convoluted trade-offs among 27 different national interests. The entire world will look at the personalities who will form the new ‘triad’ at the EU helm in the years to come. This does not mean that global notoriety should be an indispensable criterion: one can be known for all the wrong reasons, and the EU may need new fresh faces that can establish themselves over time. On top of that, the implementation of the Treaty will have to be handled with care by all, as there is undoubtedly potential for frictions, turf battles and dysfunctional solutions.

Needless to say, much will also depend on the way in which each member of the new ‘triad’ - which turns into a ‘quad’ or even a ‘quint’ if one also includes the European Parliament and the rotating Council Presidency - will interpret his/her role and function in the new system created by the Lisbon Treaty, as well as on the resources made available to perform their respective roles.

Interestingly, the European Council approved a Presidency Report - agreed in COREPER a few days before the Summit - on the European External Action Service (EEAS) that is to “support” the HR/VP. The new Treaty stipulates that the set-up of the EEAS be discussed ahead of its legal entry into force in order to have it in place as soon as possible thereafter. The Swedish Presidency Report sets some “guidelines” to that end, particularly regarding the start-up phase, but is not considered strictly binding for the future HR/VP, who will at any rate have to submit a specific proposal to the relevant EU institutions “with a view to its adoption by the Council at the latest by the end of April 2010.

Yet the issues related to the initial creation and further development of the EEAS lie at the heart of the inter-institutional debate over who should ‘do’ foreign policy in the EU and raise crucial questions about legal status, functional scope, and budgetary underpinning. After all, the EEAS represents a major innovation with (hopefully) long-lasting effects. Although everything cannot be addressed and solved in a few weeks (or even months), the initial steps will provide some clues to the future direction of the EU’s ‘foreign service’ - and will therefore be worth monitoring.

A changing climate in Brussels?

The other major discussion at the European Council was on what common position the EU should adopt for the final preparatory stages for the international climate conference in Copenhagen. On this issue, two main cleavages emerged among the EU-27.

The first was primarily (though not exclusively) of a tactical nature and revolved around whether it was preferable, at this stage, to mention specific figures on the EU’s possible share of the global funding needed to help the world’s least developed countries tackle climate change. The Commission, the Swedish Presidency, the Nordic countries and the UK argued that it was, while Germany led the opposite camp, which is generally more reluctant to make specific commitments without a clearer idea first of how much others (starting with the US) are ready to put on the table.

In the end, the Summit agreed on a formulation that accepts the Commission’s estimate that “the total net incremental costs of mitigation and adaptation in developing countries could amount to around EUR 100 billion annually by 2020, to be met through a combination of their own efforts, the international carbon market, and international public finance”. The overall level of the latter, in particular, is calculated “to lie in the range of EUR 22 to 50 billion per year by 2020, subject to a fair burden sharing at the global level in line with the distribution key to be agreed.

Furthermore, the Summit took “note of the Commission estimate that a global financing of EUR 5-7 billion per year for the first three years is needed” in the event of an “ambitious” agreement in Copenhagen - but stressed that a precise “figure will be determined in light of the outcome” of the conference.

For their part, the EU and its Member States “are ready to contribute their fair share of these costs […] conditional on other key players making comparable efforts”, according to the Presidency Conclusions. EU leaders also agreed informally that this “fair share” would amount to roughly one-third of the total, with the US hopefully covering an equal amount (the issue is to be addressed on 3 November at the EU-US Summit in Washington). In turn, Germany alone is expected to put up at least 20% of the EU’s overall contribution, which may help explain Berlin’s attitude at the Summit.

In the fast-start phase, at any rate, the Conclusions state that the EU would be ready to live up to its commitments on a “voluntary basis”. As Sweden’s Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt explained at the final press conference, this means that there is no obligation for anyone to contribute between 2010-12 (i.e. until the Kyoto Protocol expires), although some Member States are already willing to advance a significant chunk of the foreseeable sum.

In fact, the controversy over the ‘fast-start’ allocations delayed the end of the Summit on the 30th and was resolved only with the compromise on their “voluntary” nature, which - alongside the decision not to mention any specific figure for global burden-sharing - has sparked criticism from environmental organisations and cast doubts on the Union’s determination to “be at the forefront of efforts to fight climate change”.

It must, however, be acknowledged that, compared to a few months ago, the overall context has somewhat changed - and for the worse.

Many European countries are now running excessive deficits and facing spiralling public debt, with tax revenues falling and unemployment rising. Meanwhile, US legislation on cap-and-trade is stuck in Congress and is unlikely to be approved before Copenhagen, thus making it more problematic for EU governments to commit to specific figures at this stage. Still, Prime Minister Reinfeldt was probably right in saying that the EU remains in “a strong negotiating position” in the run-up to Copenhagen, and President Barroso in stating that the outcome of the Summit was “much better than expected seven days ago”.

After all, all the ambitious headline targets for reducing CO2 emissions at the regional - and global - level have once again been reiterated, including the EU’s quest for “a legally binding agreement for the period starting 1 January 2013”. As freshly re-elected German Chancellor Angela Merkel put it at the Summit, “we have only become more realistic” about the expected outcome of Copenhagen - which may now be limited, at best, to establishing a new political framework - and the need for more negotiations in 2010 and beyond.

Perhaps more worrying was the second cleavage that emerged at the European Council, namely the rebellion against EU internal burden-sharing led by a group of new Member States. This rebellion, prepared on the eve of the Summit at a separate informal meeting of nine countries, was publicly articulated by the Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers, who took issue with the idea that the poorer EU countries (whose economies are also still quite carbon-dependent) should pay for Brazil or India’s climate change measures - and, as they saw it, disproportionately so.

Their vocal opposition to the criteria presented in the Swedish Presidency’s initial draft led to a less-stringent formulation - which includes, along with GDP and current emission levels, also the rather vague notion of “ability to pay” - and to the decision to confer the task of choosing a more precise set of principles and benchmarks to an ad hoc ‘working group’. In other words, they did not succeed in having only GDP levels mentioned, but did succeed in diluting and delaying the fixing of the criteria.

Copenhagen and beyond

This move should not have been entirely unexpected. Already in late 2008, some new Member States - and some older ones, for that matter - lobbied for special concessions in the climate package eventually delivered under the French EU Presidency. Yet Swedish diplomats were taken by surprise by the assertiveness of their Central European partners.

Their extremely professional and successful preparation of the Summit culminated in smooth agreements on the Czech opt-out and the EEAS, but suffered a minor setback on this point - due also perhaps in part to their stated ambition to lead the entire Union on climate change and to demonstrate this to their own citizens.

This said, and also taking into account the diversity of conditions in different EU countries and the aspirations of their governments, all Member States must be aware by now that policy in this domain is bound to confront them with painful dilemmas. While there is widespread public support across the Union for the broad ambition and long-term goal of a carbon-free society, its implementation is already running into difficulties, essentially due to the current economic crisis and the foreseeable costs for the European taxpayers.

On top of that, climate change policy has a global dimension, underlined by the warning in the Presidency Conclusions that “action by the EU alone will not be enough”. This requires dealing with countries that do not necessarily share the EU vision and practice of multilateralism, let alone its determination to cut CO2 emissions drastically and rapidly.

This, in turn, raises a serious problem of managing expectations and adapting tactics as well as strategies in order to achieve tangible and workable results. The next weeks and months will prove decisive in this respect, and will put the Union’s external credibility as well as its internal unity to the test.




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