This analysis warns that the decisions taken at the Summit may not be sufficient, per se, to guarantee success, as a number of potential pitfalls still lie ahead.
The 18-19 June European Council reached agreement on the two main institutional issues on its agenda, namely the nomination of the European Commission President for 2009-14 and the “legally binding guarantees” to pave the way for a second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. In both cases, the decisions taken at the Summit may not be sufficient, per se, to guarantee success, as the final outcome will depend on a number of other unknowns and players in the weeks and months to come. But both were necessary to lay the foundations for bringing to an end the state of uncertainty and sense of precariousness that has affected EU institutions and policies since at least June 2008, when the Irish voted No to Lisbon.
Beyond and apart from that, the European Council agreed upon the guidelines for setting up a European Systemic Risk Board (as an early warning and recommendation body) and an overarching European System of Financial Supervisors “aimed at upgrading the quality and consistency of national supervision, strengthening oversight of cross-border groups and establishing a European single rule-book applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market”.
Consensus was reached after the Presidency Conclusions were fine-tuned to take into account the concerns expressed, especially by the UK, about the rights of non-euro zone members on the Board and the possible implications of the new system for “the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States” - for instance, whenever actions at the supra-national level might force national authorities to intervene with budgetary commitments (for example, to bail out banks in crisis situations). But this issue is likely to resurface when the Commission presents its detailed legislative proposals in the autumn.
The paragraphs devoted to the economic situation were also marginally amended at the eleventh hour - a previous reference to “further budgetary stimulus” as no longer “warranted” was deleted - but the Conclusions insisted on the need for “consolidation” to keep pace with economic recovery and for a “reliable and credible exit strategy”.
Regarding climate change, the Summit reaffirmed the principles agreed in late March and basically left it to the Commission and the forthcoming Swedish Presidency to finalise the Union’s negotiating position and internal burden-sharing deal with a view to the Copenhagen Conference in mid-December.
Last but not least, the European Council devoted a good hour of discussion to the issue of illegal immigration, at the insistence of Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus. The importance of this issue is also reflected in the Conclusions, with regard to urgent action to be taken at the Southern maritime border of the Union as well as appropriate measures to be adopted in the domain of justice, liberty and security. They ask, among other things, for the Commission to come up with further proposals for the next meeting of the 27 Heads of State and Government.
Five more years for Barroso
It is beyond doubt, however, that the most eagerly-anticipated decision at the Summit in the wake of the European Parliament elections two weeks ago was the reappointment of José Manuel Barroso as head of the European Commission for a second five-year term. The unknowns were rather related to the nature and modalities of the decision than to its content, as no other candidate had been put forward.
In the run-up to the European Council, differences had emerged over whether a full nomination was opportune - or even legal - at this stage. Germany and (especially) France had first manifested a preference for postponing the decision altogether until after the Irish referendum - partly just to buy time (Berlin goes to the polls in late September), and partly also to keep President Barroso under pressure and extract concessions from him. They then backtracked a little while keeping a degree of uncertainty over their immediate full support. By contrast, Sweden had expressed its preference for an immediate nomination, not least to have a fully-fledged interlocutor in Brussels during its forthcoming Presidency - and all three countries’ governments are headed by European People’s Party (EPP) leaders.
For its part, the defeated Party of European Socialists (PES) had not come up with any alternative name, either during the election campaign or afterwards. Internal divisions and rivalries played a crucial role in all this, including the fact that three out of four serving Socialist Prime Ministers in the EU (Gordon Brown, José Luis Zapatero and José Socrates) had already declared their support for Mr Barroso some time ago. Only the Greens, spearheaded by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, had declared their intention to put up a fight against him, either by trying to postpone his appointment until the autumn or by coming up with an alternative name on the occasion of the confirmation vote in the European Parliament.
In the end, the 27 EU leaders “agreed unanimously” on Mr Barroso “as the person they intend to nominate as President of the Commission for the period 2009-14” [italics added]. But they also mandated the current (Czech) and next (Swedish) presidency to “have discussions with the European Parliament in order to determine whether the Parliament is in a position to approve that nomination at its July plenary session”. If that proves to be the case, the Council “will formalise its decision on the nomination” ahead of the Parliament plenary - most probably by written procedure, i.e. without formally convening another Summit.
The unanimous decision was not a foregone conclusion, as the Nice Treaty allows for Qualified Majority Voting on this point. President Barroso was therefore justifiably “not only proud but also moved” - as he told journalists at a late-night press conference - by the bipartisan support he eventually received following the presentation he made of his ‘vision’ for the next five years.
Still, his (re)appointment did not spark an outburst of enthusiasm among either the media or EU leaders themselves: it was largely seen as an obvious choice and one that, while certainly guaranteeing welcome experience and continuity in the management of EU affairs (especially in turbulent times), will still have to prove its worth in the difficult years to come.
Moreover, some uncertainty remains over President Barroso’s reappointment or, more likely, its possible timing. As the EPP does not have an overall majority in the newly-elected Parliament, Mr Barroso’s confirmation at the 15 July plenary in Strasbourg (the day after the inaugural session) therefore requires consultations and, arguably, negotiations with other groups - which explains the mandate given to the two EU Presidencies. The Nice Treaty does not explicitly foresee such consultation but the Lisbon Treaty does, and a number of outgoing MEPs had insisted on some form of “anticipation” of the new provisions in order to show the ‘necessary respect’ to the Union’s directly-elected assembly.
This said, it is hard to understand what may have led the PES group leader Martin Schulz to say that President Barroso’s nomination was “politically, institutionally and legally unacceptable”. Mr Barroso was, from the outset, the EPP’s preferred candidate (he received preliminary endorsement in March), and the EPP came out on top in the 4-7 June elections. Also, the Nice Treaty - still in force - foresees the appointment of the new Commission President following the procedures that have just been adopted. Per se, in other words, the uncertainty over the ‘frozen’ Treaty of Lisbon does not permit a general delay - and the overall economic and political situation in Europe does not suggest it either.
Yet Mr Schulz’s statement may betray a willingness on the part of a significant number of MEPs, especially from the left, to raise the stakes for the 15 July vote. Outright rejection of the nominee appears highly unlikely, as no coherent majority seems to exist in the new Parliament without and against the centre-right - and since both the PES (or the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats for Europe, as it may come to be called following the arrangement with the new MEPs from Italy’s Partito Democratico) and the ALDE groups could well split in a secret ballot over Mr Barroso.
The vote on his nomination is not the only personnel decision to be taken by the Parliament in mid-July: MEPs will also have to elect their own President on 14 July, and this may require a power-sharing agreement across the aisle (following past precedents) which, in turn, may end up facilitating President Barroso’s confirmation. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that consultations leading up to such a power-sharing agreement may also include balanced concessions - by political ‘family’ and by nationality - on the future Commission (including portfolios) and possibly other top jobs, such as those foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty.
Interestingly, the Summit Conclusions state that “the process of nomination of other persons who will be appointed as members of the Commission can only be initiated when the legal basis for the nomination procedure has become clear”. In plain English: the Member States will wait until after the Irish referendum to formally announce the names of their respective candidates for the new Commission, as Nice and Lisbon include different provisions regarding the overall size of the College.
This may entail a minor delay in the next Commission’s entry into office (and a short extension of the current one), but could allow Mr Barroso - especially if confirmed on 15 July - to use the summer months to consult the 27 capitals informally about possible names and portfolios. On the one hand, this would permit him to honour possible arrangements made with party groups and national governments; on the other, it could give him additional leverage in shaping the next College.
The precedent of 2004 - with his controversial appointment followed by the “crisis of investitures” with the Parliament - should have taught him to tread carefully with MEPs and not to take his own speedy confirmation for granted, but also not to hesitate to use his growing “presidential” powers to play competing pressures from the Member States off against one another and aim at building the best possible team to work for the EU over the next five years.
The Irish package
In the end, the intergovernmental negotiations on the guarantees (or rather reassurances) to be given to Ireland to make it possible for its government to call a second referendum on Lisbon in the early autumn came to a relatively smooth and successful conclusion. The main challenge consisted in granting Dublin language and procedures that would convey the sense of additional safeguards being given without opening the Pandora’s box of additional ratifications in the other 26 Member States.
The final ‘package’ for Dublin includes four main elements:
-
A political agreement on the ‘one Commissioner per Member State’ rule, already reached last December. This means that if Lisbon enters into force by the end of 2009, the new Commission will temporarily keep its current 27 members, but extending this format beyond 2014 will require formalising the agreement unanimously;
-
A dedicated “Decision of the Heads of State and Government on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon”, attached to the Presidency Conclusions [Annex 1], which basically reaffirms that the Lisbon Treaty a) does not affect in any way Ireland’s legislation and sovereignty as regards the “right to life, family and education” policy; b) does not change the existing EU rules regarding taxation “for any Member State”; c) does not alter the guarantees that “each Member State, including Ireland” has in the domain of foreign, security and defence policy, nor create new obligations. This “decision shall take effect on the same date as the Lisbon Treaty”;
-
A somewhat cryptic “Solemn Declaration on workers’ rights, social policy and other issues” [Annex 2] that is not explicitly addressed to Ireland (or any other Member State) and basically explains the limited impact of the Lisbon Treaty (and the Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to it) in this area while also reaffirming where it does not affect, directly or indirectly, “the competence of the Member States”. Negotiations on this element of the package were particularly sensitive, especially for the UK;
-
A “National Declaration by Ireland” entirely centred on foreign and defence policy, in which Dublin confirms that Lisbon does not affect its international status and domestic sovereignty in decision-making regarding the new provisions enshrined in the Treaty. It represents at the same time a reinforcement of the “decision” mentioned above and a binding commitment vis-à-vis the Irish citizens - and it “will be associated with Ireland’s instrument of ratification” in the event of a Yes vote in the second referendum.
At the final press conference, Czech Prime Minister and EU President Jan Fischer described the package as a “clarifying, explanatory text that changes nothing” and a “legally binding decision in line with the Lisbon Treaty”. The decision will be transposed into a Protocol annexed to the existing treaties “at the time of the conclusion of the next accession treaty” with any new possible Member State, as the Presidency Conclusions state [so too will, incidentally, the “Transitional measures to be taken concerning the composition and number of members of the European Parliament”, already agreed months ago and now formalised in Annex 4].
Mr Fischer’s remarks were in part addressed to his own President, Vaclav Klaus, who meanwhile had released a message arguing that the guarantees for Ireland meant that the Lisbon Treaty would have to be re-ratified by the Czech Parliament - a position his Prime Minister considered unfounded - thus further delaying (and potentially derailing) the entire process.
For his part, Irish Taoiseach Brian Cowen declared that the package made it possible for the government to call a new referendum, triggering the necessary constitutional procedure in early July to hold the vote in early October. He seemed confident that, this time around, the vote could be won, due to the additional guarantees, a stronger engagement in the campaign by all the pro-European forces, and the changed economic and psychological climate in the country. The heavy defeat at the European elections of both Declan Ganley’s ‘Libertas’ list and Sinn Fein - which spearheaded the No campaign last year - has also given all the mainstream parties more confidence that the case can be won and the page turned once and for all.
This said, a referendum is always fraught with unknowns, and three months can still be a very long time in politics. Much could happen between now and then, in Ireland and elsewhere. On 30 June, the German Constitutional Court is expected to release its ruling on the compatibility of Lisbon with the Basic Law. Doubts persist over the eventual behaviour of the Czech and Polish presidents, who have so far both refused to sign the ratification acts approved by their parliaments. The fragile domestic political situation in the UK and the potential collapse of Gordon Brown’s government could pave the way for the Eurosceptic Conservatives, who have pledged to call a snap referendum on Lisbon if elected before it enters into force (and have threatened to renegotiate it if elected afterwards). The fact that the British Tories and the parties inspired by Vaclav Klaus and Lech Kaczynsky are about to form a single group in the new Parliament only strengthens lingering fears about a possible ‘anti-Lisbon pact’ among them.
Czeching it out
Still, on balance, the picture looks less bleak and uncertain now than just a few months ago - at least in this particular respect. Prime Minister Fischer resorted to Czech humour by saying at the very end that “one needs not be a statistician” (which he notoriously is) to rate the success of the European Council at 100%. Within the limits of what was achievable, and considering what could still have gone wrong, the Summit indeed ended on a satisfactory note. But much remains to be done before Lisbon can eventually be ‘unfrozen’, put in place and, last but not least, properly implemented.
If the Irish citizens say Yes in October, the European Council scheduled for the end of that month will probably be called upon to make the other top appointments (the President of the European Council and the High Representative/Commission Vice-President), while the new Commission will start taking proper shape and undergo the scrutiny of the European Parliament.
In early December, a more specific mandate will be given to the Spanish Presidency to coordinate and facilitate the ensuing steps and decisions regarding the full implementation of Lisbon. Meanwhile, Sweden will remain in charge - as the likely last fully-fledged holder of the rotating EU Presidency - of addressing current issues, including the economic downturn, preparations for Copenhagen, and another mounting crisis over gas between Ukraine and Russia. It will probably be supported and assisted by President Barroso and what is left of the outgoing Commission, but the task already looks quite challenging.
While wishing Stockholm a good, productive and crisis-free semester at the EU helm, a few words must also be devoted to Prague’s EU Presidency. The Czechs were not very lucky from the outset, in part because old and new crises piled up from early January, and in part also because they were following in France’s footsteps (and Paris itself did little to help). It is also arguable that the Czech government made the mistake of pretending to play the same game as France by trying to lead by example - and sometimes to “épater les bourgeois” (‘shock’ the established middle-classes) - by calling extra Summits to show initiative and leadership, and occasionally also by using the EU chair and stage to make controversial statements.
The 2008 French Presidency was, however, unique in many ways, and the result of unusual circumstances. In normal times, the main role of an EU President consists of being, first, a facilitator of consensus and, second, a problem-solver if necessary. Whenever a country (big or small) has tried to exploit the Presidency to score extra points for itself, the semester has often ended in tears.
Unfortunately, the domestic situation in the Czech Republic only made matters worse, as the lack of a temporary ceasefire between opposing and equally strong political camps pushed a politically fragile Prime Minister to raise the stakes and strive to look more assertive - and controversial - on the international scene (as when he famously described US President Barack Obama’s economic policy as “a road to hell”).
The vote of no-confidence that brought the government down in mid-semester marked a turning-point in the Presidency. On the one hand, while sealing the rather unhappy experience of the previous months, it created an initial problem of continuity in day-to-day management. On the other, paradoxically, the much lower political profile adopted by the new ‘technocratic’ government (fresh elections will take place in October) helped to mend some wounds and eased the path to the June Summit. The experience and professionalism of Foreign Minister Jan Kohout (a long-time negotiator with Brussels and a former Permanent Representative to the EU), in particular, made it possible to bring Prague’s mandate to a relatively successful end.
Maybe there are lessons to be learned here for other EU Member States?
