This analysis argues that the Summit, along with the General Affairs and External Relations Council earlier in the week, nevertheless provided a comprehensive picture of the ‘state of the Union’ at the end of one era and the beginning of another, opening a new phase in the European integration process.
The European Council of 10-11 December came at the end of an extremely dense period of EU Summits (it was the fourth in three months) and decisions concerning the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. As a result, its agenda was relatively thin and the meeting ended up being dominated by discussions on the EU’s negotiating position at the United Nations Climate Conference underway in Copenhagen, following on from the debate already begun at the 29-30 October Summit.
However, along with the General Affairs and External Relations Council (the last of this kind) held earlier in the week, the first-ever meeting of the European Council in its new capacity as an autonomous EU institution provided a comprehensive picture of the ‘state of the Union’ at the end of an era - one characterised by the Nice Treaty, the ‘big bang’ enlargement and the travails of institutional reform - and the beginning of a new phase in the integration process.
Between Brussels and Copenhagen
The debate among the Heads of State and Government of the EU-27 centred, once again, first on whether it was advisable to quantify a specific European contribution to the ‘fast-start’ fund to help developing countries cope with, and adapt to, the consequences of climate change (Germany, in particular, dragged its feet, mainly for tactical reasons); and then, once the UK, France and Sweden showed their determination to do so, on the overall amount of the EU ‘offer’ and Member States’ individual contributions.
In the end, the EU-27 committed themselves to putting up €2.4 billion annually for the years 2010-12 (covering the transitional period towards a new multilateral agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012). European Commission President José Manuel Barroso stressed afterwards that the eventual offer “exceeds what could be expected from the EU”. The biggest contributors in absolute terms are, notably, the UK (which pledged €1.5 billion over three years and had already earmarked significant resources to this end, now channelled into the common fund), Germany (€1.3 billion over three years) and France, followed at some distance by Sweden (the highest in per capita terms), Italy and Spain.
All Member States agreed to participate in the scheme, although some (like Romania and Latvia) with rather symbolic sums, and the Presidency Conclusions call on other “developed countries” to announce their own contributions, with a view to reaching a global amount of €7 billion annually by 2012.
The Summit also reiterated the EU’s offer to “move to a 30% reduction [of CO2 emissions] by 2020 compared to 1990 levels” - i.e. an increase of 10% as compared to the 20-20-20 blueprint - but only on condition “that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities”.
The Swedish EU Presidency was once again at the forefront of the drive for an ambitious EU approach and, once again, encountered some scepticism from Poland and other Member States. On the other hand, some leaders criticised more or less explicitly the modest target set by the US administration, which has so far only committed itself to reducing CO2 emissions by a meagre 4% by 2020.
At any rate, the results of the EU Summit are now being carried over to Copenhagen, where the UN negotiations are reaching crunch time. The Presidency Conclusions insist that an agreement in the Danish capital “should lead to finalising a legally-binding instrument, preferably within six months”, for the period starting on 1 January 2013 - language that seems to acknowledge that Washington will not be able to deliver any legislation to this effect until next spring at the earliest.
Implementing Lisbon
The December EU Summit was the first to be held on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December. As such, it was the first one to which foreign ministers were not invited, as the new Treaty - while establishing the European Council as an EU institution in its own right - also states that its only members are the Heads of State and Government of the EU-27, plus the Commission President and the Vice-President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The decision to exclude foreign ministers had ruffled a few feathers in the run-up to the Summit, with some national authorities apparently only belatedly realising some of the implications of the new institutional set-up.
For this and other reasons, the Summit dinner on the evening of 10 December was devoted to an informal discussion on the future of such meetings, in which the newly-appointed European Council President Herman Van Rompuy participated. (He did not chair the Summit because the European Council itself had decided on 19 November that, by derogation, Sweden would continue to exercise the EU Presidency in full until the end of its term.)
Still, the new President offered a first glimpse of the way in which he intends to carry out his mandate. He made it clear that he plans to participate in Council meetings - most of which will still be chaired by the country holding the six-month rotating Presidency - in order to better coordinate legislative work. He also alluded to the possibility of inviting relevant ministers to future sessions of the European Council: for instance, finance ministers to the March Economic Summit and foreign ministers whenever foreign policy issues are central to the agenda, but not on a permanent basis.
This new centrality (and growing frequency) of Heads of State and Government meetings reflects the evolution of EU policy-making over the past two decades. Long a domaine réservé of foreign ministries, European integration policy began to involve central bankers, finance and treasury ministries in the 1990s, in conjunction with monetary union, Since then, an increasing number of national officials from sectoral ministries (including home, justice and environment) have come regularly to Brussels, thus epitomising the increasingly ‘inter-domestic’ nature of EU affairs and, with it, the need for better coordination and leadership at prime-ministerial level.
The gradual implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is not limited to the European Council: new Rules of Procedures have to be agreed for both the Council and the Commission; the residual role of the rotating Presidency (and the resulting ‘trio’) needs to be clarified; and the status and shape of the European External Action Service (EEAS) must be finalised in the first months of 2010.
Incidentally, the Summit agreed to appoint 49-year-old Uwe Corsepius - a close advisor to Angela Merkel in the German Chancellery and the man who drafted the new treaty text in the spring of 2007 - to succeed Pierre de Boissieu as Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, another function revamped and upgraded by the Lisbon Treaty. (Mr de Boissieu, Deputy Secretary-General under Javier Solana, was appointed by the previous European Council until June 2011.)
Last, but certainly not least, the way in which the European Parliament will interact with the other EU institutions - not least in light of its extended co-decision powers - will only become clearer over time. Its composition also still needs a minor (if only temporary) adjustment to take account of the 18 extra MEPs due to join it until 2014, and whose (s)election raises some tricky legal issues and, at any rate, requires a dedicated Intergovernmental Conference. (Spain, which will benefit most from the adjustment, is trying to speed up the procedure.)
It is, however, already evident that the European Parliament is turning into a European equivalent of the US House of Representatives, in terms of composition, budgetary and legislative powers, and scrutiny of the executive. And it is no accident that Commission President Barroso has appointed a Commissioner for inter-institutional relations (who will also be one of the Vice-Presidents). An interesting test of the new set-up will come in January 2010, with the hearings of the new Commissioners in the relevant committees and final parliamentary vote on the entire College. Only after that (and the establishment of EEAS) will the initial implementation phase of the Lisbon Treaty be complete - and transition turn into consolidation.
Paris, London and... Athens
A few pages of the Presidency Conclusions are also devoted to the “economic, financial and employment situation” across Europe, basically recapitulating the decisions taken in recent months and others already in the pipeline, including the establishment of a European Systemic Risk Board and three new supervisory authorities for banks, insurance and securities markets - due to become operational “during the course of 2010”.
Interestingly, the Conclusions include a paragraph in which the European Council “encourages the IMF to consider the full range of options including insurance fees, resolution funds, contingent capital arrangements and a global financial levy” in its review of financial regulations worldwide.
The reference to a “global financial levy” - commonly known as the ‘Tobin tax’, after the late US economist James Tobin who first proposed it - was added following the support given to the idea during the joint briefing given at the Summit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in a display of Anglo-French unity intended to counter speculation about a rift fuelled by the controversy over the appointment of Michel Barnier as the new Internal Market Commissioner.
As some commentators observed, roughly one century after the famous diplomatic entente cordiale between Paris and London, a surprising entente financière now appears to go hand-in-hand with the entente environnementale struck over the fast-start fund - but it remains to be seen whether any of these will hold after the UK elections next spring.
Some attention was also paid - although more on the margins of the Summit than in the meeting room itself - to Greece’s financial situation, following the recent downgrading of the country’s creditworthiness by the Fitch rating agency and Athens’ admission that its 2009 deficit could be above 12% and its debt could exceed 110% of GDP.
Newly-elected Prime Minister George Papandreou gave a presentation to his peers in which he committed his government to swift and robust action to reform public finances and curb widespread corruption and tax evasion, while formally ruling out any prospect of a formal bail-out or general default.
Updating Lisbon (and the budget)
The Summit also dealt with the ‘other’ Lisbon: the review of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs due for completion next year. Amid scant praise for the old one, the Presidency Conclusions stress that, “in view of the economic and social impact of the crisis, in view also of the challenges posed by ageing populations, increasing inequalities and climate change, a new approach is needed more than ever”.
The aim is to launch a new strategy for ‘Europe 2020’, with another ten-year horizon and, possibly, also a “reflection on the methodology to be used”, with the Conclusions stating that “a more efficient and transparent governance structure is needed, geared towards reaching tangible results” - given that the so-called ‘Open Method of Coordination’ adopted for the Lisbon Strategy has produced hardly any.
To this end, the Commission has already launched a consultation and the forthcoming Spanish EU Presidency is planning an informal meeting of the European Council in February to carry out such a reflection, with a view to holding a “full discussion” at the March Summit, when the main guidelines for ‘Europe 2020’ should be agreed.
Lastly, the European Council revisited the issue of the so-called mid-term ‘budget review’ decided on in 2005 and constantly deferred, asking the Commission to “come forward with a report in order to provide orientations on priorities during 2010” and then to present “its proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework at the latest by July 2011”. In other words, the planned mid-term exercise is being directly channelled into the run-up to the next budgetary negotiations, due to culminate between late 2011 and 2012.
Evaluating Stockholm
With the conclusion of Sweden’s second EU Presidency (the first one was in early 2001), the system of rotating Presidencies as we know it also comes to an end.
The latter is not going to disappear entirely: it is here to stay for the General Affairs Council, the specialised Council formations (bar Foreign Affairs and the Eurogroup), and COREPER. But the well-established practice whereby one country at a time is in charge of EU affairs for six months is fading away: Spain may still play a central and somehow supplementary role, due to the ongoing installation of the new EU bodies and institutions, but Belgium - in the second half of 2010 - is expected to bring the transition to an end.
Stockholm had the unenviable task of managing the run-up to, and aftermath of, the second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, held on 2 October - a task it carried out with the right mix of caution and respect for each country’s sovereign decisions, on the one hand, and firmness and decisiveness in speeding up the ratification process and the Treaty’s entry into force, on the other.
Then it had to conduct the consultations on the new personnel appointments required by Lisbon, turning into - as President Barroso jokingly put it in the final press conference - a “recruitment agency for top jobs”. There was a moment, a few days before the 19 November Extraordinary Summit, when the process seemed to run completely out of control, with wild speculation abounding in the media and an apparent lack of political direction, which prompted a cry of desperation from the traditionally calm Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt.
From that point on, however, the well-known professionalism of Swedish officials and leaders regained control of the policy-making process, leading to a satisfactory conclusion of a semester that appeared fraught with difficulties and traps from the outset.
If reaching a final deal on climate change was laborious (partly because Sweden itself wanted an ambitious agreement for domestic reasons) and the outcome depends very much on the results of the Copenhagen negotiations, the Swedish Presidency will also be remembered for the delivery of the new Stockholm Programme for Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS), subtitled “An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens”. This successor to the 2005-09 Hague Programme aims to set common guidelines for the period 2010-14 by “taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty”.
The new programme covers a wide range of policy areas - from immigration and asylum to the integration of migrants, from border management to visa facilitation, from the preservation of civil liberties to more traditional internal security issues, including a new emphasis on the external dimension of JLS. A dedicated Action Plan for its implementation is to be adopted by the EU “at the latest in June 2010”, and “a mid-term review [submitted] before June 2012”.
Interestingly, the Presidency Conclusions also explicitly mention the need to draft and agree upon “an internal security strategy” - analogous and arguably complementary to the European Security Strategy elaborated by Javier Solana in late 2003 (and reviewed in 2008) for the Union’s foreign and security policy - to tackle “organised crime, terrorism and other threats” on the basis, inter alia, of the new Treaty article (222 TFEU) normally referred to as the “solidarity clause”.
The Conclusions do not specify who will be tasked with leading this exercise, or when it should be concluded. Yet it will be worth watching the role of the new Home Affairs Commissioner-designate, Cecilia Malmstrom, the outgoing Swedish Minister for European Affairs and chair of General Affairs Council meetings for the past six months, who oversaw the drafting of the Stockholm Programme and the preparation of the Summit conclusions. (Similarly, the Danish Minister for Environment and Climate Change and co-host of the UN Conference in Copenhagen, Connie Hedegaard, is about to become the European Commissioner for Climate Action.)
Europe 2010
However, the Presidency Conclusions alone do not tell the whole story. A couple of days before the Summit, EU foreign ministers also adopted a number of decisions that set the stage not only for 2010 but, probably, for many years to come.
Firstly, they decided to create a working group to begin preparing Croatia’s Accession Treaty, following the settlement of the border dispute with Slovenia reached in November, with January 2012 set as the target date for Zagreb’s entry into the Union.
Secondly, they opted to take a very soft line with the other candidate country involved in accession negotiations - Turkey - by simply confirming the freeze on opening some chapters, despite the ongoing lack of compliance by the country’s government with the so-called Ankara Protocol (on opening ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus), while praising the improvement in the domestic situation, particularly with regard to the rights of the Kurdish population - an assessment starkly challenged just hours after the EU Summit by a ruling from Turkey’s Constitutional Court banning Kurdish parties for five years.
Thirdly, they decided to implement - as of 19 December 2009 - a visa-free regime for citizens from Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro, thus meeting a long-standing and deeply felt demand from Western Balkan citizens.
Fourthly, they gave the green light to the Interim Agreement, again with Serbia, with a view to ratifying the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Belgrade shortly, mainly thanks to the Dutch government’s decision to lift its long-standing objections.
Finally, they put the finishing touches to the package accompanying the Eastern Partnership, launched in spring 2009, while taking note of the political paralysis plaguing the Union for the Mediterranean (which will probably constitute a priority for Spain throughout 2010).
Responsibility for all these programmes and schemes is now being handed over to Stefan Füle, the Czech Commissioner-designate for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy and, of course, to Catherine Ashton as the new HR/VP. In other words, in this respect as well, the Lisbon Treaty is expected to create new and hopefully better conditions for more effective EU action both internally and in its immediate vicinity.
In 2010, a completely new page in the European integration process is about to be opened.
