United we stand - for now

Mar 23, 2009
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This analysis concludes that the Summit did succeed in shaping and showing a united EU front on all the main issues on the agenda, and agreeing on a series of concrete coordinated steps – no mean achievement in light of the tensions in the run-up to the meeting.


The outcome of the European Council held on 19-20 March was summarised by Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek in numbers: “5, 50, 75” – the amounts of money (in billions of euro) allocated by the EU-27 for new initiatives to combat the economic crisis.

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso spoke of “a summit of delivery”, sending a “message of confidence and solidarity” both inside and outside the Union. Indeed, the Spring EU Summit managed to shape and show a united EU front on all the main issues on the agenda and agree on a series of concrete coordinated steps.

In light of the overall situation and the way in which Member States had conducted themselves in the previous weeks, these were not minor achievements.

The long march to the March Summit

Tensions had started to pile up at the beginning of February, triggered, among other things, by French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s remarks about his government’s intention to ‘repatriate’ jobs and investments in the national car industry in response to the economic downturn. This was already questionable enough, in terms of distorting the rules of the single market, to push the Commission into asking for details. But President Sarkozy made matters worse by referring explicitly to a factory in the Czech Republic, which, in turn, prompted a sharp reaction from the EU Presidency.

The argument between the two capitals got somewhat out of hand, with the Czech Prime Minister claiming France’s attitude risked derailing ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Prague, and was followed by the announcement that two extraordinary European Council meetings would be convened: the first (on 1 March in Brussels) to discuss how to counter “protectionism” – rather than how to address the global financial crisis (as originally suggested by Paris in association with Berlin) - and the second (in May in Prague) to discuss how best to fight rising unemployment across the Union.

The Franco-Czech spat subsided a little in the following weeks, not least thanks to Germany’s intervention (with Berlin very active in pushing for a renewed Franco-German dialogue and cooperation on EU economic affairs) and the Commission itself, which negotiated with Paris over the scope and manner of government action in support of the French car industry, eventually bringing it more into line with similar provisions adopted elsewhere in the Union and the principles of the internal market. Berlin helped also by promoting a meeting of the EU members of the G-20, in late February to coordinate their actions ahead of the 2 April London summit – a meeting that included the so-called G4, Spain, the Netherlands and also the Czech Presidency. As a result, another potential source of internal EU tension was dealt with wisely and inclusively.

Another lingering cleavage among the 27 emerged on the eve of the 1 March Summit when Poland convened a separate meeting of Central European countries to advocate more “solidarity” between old and new Member States, and between members of the euro zone and those still outside it.

This meeting was prompted by rising fears of financial collapse in some countries (Hungary and Latvia inside the EU, Ukraine and the Balkans outside) and by the mixed signals appearing to come from Frankfurt, Berlin and Brussels itself about their readiness to help. However, the alleged “Central European front” melted away, especially when countries such as Slovakia (in the euro zone since last January) and the Czech Republic itself made it clear that they did not want to be put in the same basket as fellow new EU members. Even Poland, in the end, acknowledged that there were only some specific cases which required such solidarity. Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquin Almunia, in turn, made it explicit that measures were already being taken (and more would be taken if necessary) but without too much public noise, partly to avoid offering targets for speculative action.

It became apparent, in other words, that the crisis has no specifically East versus West features: there are particularly vulnerable countries both among the older Member States (Ireland, Greece) and the newer ones, and differences over how to (re)act are discernible in both groups.

While the Stability Pact for the euro explicitly rules out any “bail out” guarantee for countries (as does Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty), it is possible to intervene at the Community level when a Member State “is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond its control” (Article 100). Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) can act to support European countries outside the euro zone – as they have already started to do.

As a result, the 1 March Summit reaffirmed:

·          the importance of sticking to the rules of the Single Market as an essential element of European integration;

·          the need to improve regulation and monitoring of financial activities at both EU and global level;

·          the urgent need to re-establish the credit flows required for the proper functioning of the economy (including dealing with ‘toxic assets’ owned by banks);

·          the necessity to coordinate national plans for the automobile sector;

·          the imperative to maintain (in perspective) sound public finances and budgetary practices as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact;

·          the importance of acting to combat the negative impact of the economic downturn on employment levels;

·          the crucial role to be played by the EU in the decisions to be taken at global level to this effect, notably at the forthcoming G-20 Summit.

Between EU and US

If this helped assuage the tensions of the previous weeks, another issue emerged in the immediate run-up to the Spring Summit, prompted in particular by pressure from Washington on the Europeans to do more to fuel the ailing international economy.

US officials had been complaining for some time that the stimulus plans put in place or announced by EU countries were largely insufficient to tackle the crisis, and insisting that injecting large sums of additional public money into the economy was by far the key priority at this stage (while better regulation of financial markets would be for later on).

This came to a head at a meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Horsham, in southern England, over the weekend preceding the EU Summit, at which US President Barack Obama’s Chief Economic Advisor Larry Summers adopted a particularly harsh tone towards the Europeans, causing some irritation. That meeting ended with a compromise whereby two “tracks” would be followed and acted on in London in early April.

However, France and Germany decided to launch a joint initiative, writing to the Czech Presidency on the eve of the EU Summit to underline the urgent need for Europe to push for much tighter regulation of financial markets, along the lines of the recent report by the High Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière. “The first priority”, the letter insisted, “is to build a new global financial architecture.”

This letter stemmed from two converging concerns: the first, typically German (and particularly strong in an electoral year), is that pumping more money into the economy could derail the ‘virtuous’ path prescribed by the Stability Pact and increase the burden on future generations; the second, shared by France (and others), is that the current crisis opens a unique but also short-lived window of opportunity to bring about much-needed reforms of the European and global financial system. These range from increasing transparency and accountability and strengthening monitoring and early warning mechanisms to addressing the problem of “safe havens”. Accordingly, focusing primarily (if not exclusively) on stimulus plans risks both undermining fiscal stability and postponing indefinitely the reform of cross-border financial regulation.

Interestingly, the Franco-German initiative highlighted (albeit indirectly) the awkward situations of both the UK and the Czech Presidency. As chair of the G-20, London had to strike a balance between the American and European positions, thus advocating the “twin track” approach mentioned above. At the same time, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown found (and still finds) himself in a difficult position. In his former capacity as UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had long opposed Germany’s views on tighter financial regulation while pursuing a rigorous fiscal policy. As Prime Minister, he has been forced to do exactly the opposite, injecting huge amounts of public money into the economy while arguing that more international regulation is now indispensable.

Conversely, the Czech government has found itself holding the Union’s reins – and thus tasked with forging acceptable solutions for all partners – while opposing both Keynesian fiscal policies and more regulation, and radically at odds with the US administration on doctrinal as well as political grounds while being staunchly Atlanticist and only tepidly EU-minded.

75 + 50 + 5 = confidence + stability + solidarity?

Given all this, therefore, the Summit was a qualified success. In fact, concrete decisions were taken on:

·          Europe’s additional voluntary contribution (€75 billion) to the IMF in the framework of the relevant decision taken at G-20 level in Horsham;

·          doubling the size (from €25 to €50 billion) of a dedicated financial “facility” to provide “balance of payment support for eligible Member States that need it”;

·          the scope and modalities for spending an extra Community fund (up to €5 billion) on energy- and IT-related projects as part of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP).

While the first decision was hardly controversial (the only uncertainty was over its eventual size), the second and (especially) the third were discussed and negotiated on at length before and during the Summit.

The new facility had been in the pipeline for some time – the government in Budapest had gone as far as to ask for €150-200 billion - but it was somewhat surprising that Germany, in particular, had agreed to such a significant increase. In fact, it is the closest thing to a partial ‘bail out’ fund (complementary to those provided by other financial institutions), with significant chunks already assigned to Hungary and Latvia, with Romania next on the list. While it appears wise to increase the sums of money available, many observers wondered whether this means that other interventions are likely or already planned, especially since the language adopted (“eligible Member States that need it”) leaves much room for manoeuvre as well as speculation.

For its part, the €5-billion fund is made up of unspent money from the EU budget that the Commission had proposed to recycle in order to add a Community-proper contribution to the various national stimulus packages back in November. This prompted a difficult debate in the Council about both the wisdom of not giving that money back to the Member States (as the law prescribes) and the way(s) in which the €5 billion should be spent.

Germany, the Union’s ‘paymaster general’ (it covers alone roughly 20% of all EU expenses), was particularly edgy and eventually managed to set tight conditions on the use of the fund: it should be spent by the end of 2010; should only go to projects that are already reasonably advanced and for which there is no conceivable alternative funding; and any money that remains unspent will have to be paid back to the Member States according to the usual ‘keys’. Berlin also managed to include in the list of the projects to be considered for extra funding some that are particular dear to Germany (including money for its milk producers). This may well have been the price to be paid for getting the green light from Chancellor Angela Merkel in the midst of a long and uncertain domestic electoral campaign.

Taken together, these conditions will probably limit the eventual impact of the fund, despite the official rhetoric. Still, top of the list of eligible projects are the Southern Gas Corridor (‘Nabucco pipeline’), with an allocation of €200 million, and a number of initiatives aimed at improving gas interconnections inside the Union, not least to meet the ever-louder demands from the new Member States for greater energy “security” (especially since January’s Ukraine-Russia gas dispute) - an issue which is particularly dear to the Czech Presidency.

Other projects include offshore wind parks in the North and Baltic Seas, broadband interconnectors in Central and Southern Europe, and carbon capture and storage schemes. The list appears designed to accommodate different regional and Member State interests, in line with the best EU traditions and, arguably, also to make it easier to get the European Parliament’s approval for the package before its April “recess” ahead of the forthcoming elections.

Regarding the EERP as a whole, the Commission presented a detailed progress report at the Summit highlighting the fact that the fiscal effort amounts to more than €400 billion overall (3.3 % of total GDP), of which roughly half consists of “automatic stabilisers” (welfare benefits which rise in an economic downturn) and the other half of national anti-cyclical packages. The US effort to date amounts to 5.5 % of its GDP.

The EU and the crisis

As for the rest, the Presidency Conclusions reiterated the policy mix for responding to the economic crisis already agreed on 1 March, but with a clear emphasis on “the need to reshape macroeconomic global management and the regulatory framework for financial markets”, on the one hand, and on the other the obligation for Member States – when adopting measures to support the real economy and employment – to act “in a timely, targeted and temporary manner” and respect the “guiding principles” of both the internal market and the Lisbon Agenda.

They also describe the de Larosière Report as “the basis for action” in reforming financial regulation, with the “first decisions” on this to be taken at the June European Council (followed by “more detailed legislative proposals in the autumn”), and somewhat ‘downgrade’ the extraordinary Employment Summit planned for May in Prague to a troika meeting with the social partners.

The Conclusions also set out the common EU position for the G-20 Summit (basically a photocopy of the one adopted at the ‘G-4-plus’ meeting on 22 February in Berlin) and include a dedicated section on preparations for the Copenhagen Conference on climate change, which underlines that the EU “will take on its fair share of financing” mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries, but will decide on its specific contribution (and how to share the burden among Member States) later, when it becomes clearer – as President Barroso explained in the final press conference – what the other key players intend to do.

Finally, the Spring Summit gave the green light to the EU’s new Eastern Partnership (EaP), another Czech Presidency priority, finalising a decision adopted already by EU foreign ministers just ahead of the European Council. While the eventual shape and scope of the EaP will probably depend on the fate of the Lisbon Treaty (and the way in which EU ‘foreign policy’ may be reorganised if and when it enters into force), the Council discussion revolved around what position to take vis-à-vis Belarus, the sixth country involved in the EaP scheme along with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In the end, the foreign ministers had agreed on another twin-track approach: formally extending the sanctions against the leadership in Minsk by one year while “suspending” those same sanctions for a few months. This would allow either President Lukaschenka or (more likely) the foreign minister to attend the launching event of the EaP, planned for 7 May in Prague or Brussels.

This somewhat schizophrenic compromise was probably necessary to bring together those Member States which want to reward Belarus for marginal improvements on the human rights’ front and for not aligning itself entirely with Moscow (e.g. on the recognition of Abkhasia and South Ossetia) and those which, instead, did not see enough improvement to lift the sanctions and accept Minsk as a ‘normal’ partner, after years of non-relations.

But this is the way the Union works, of course, all the more so since it has taken in 12 new members in a just few years. The spectrum of internal EU preferences and attitudes on policies has widened further (although not only, and not necessarily, between East and West or old and new members), and achieving common positions has become especially complicated. Almost five years after enlargement, however, it would be unfair and wrong to say that the Union’s expansion per se has made policy-making harder.

More often than not, in fact, a bloc of 20-odd member states tends to converge broadly on a policy, with a few countries (normally both old and new members) asking for special conditions or ad hoc exceptions: if these are accommodated, one way or the other, then consensus ‘at 27’ is achieved. This is what has happened on such diverse issues as the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty, the independence of Kosovo and the EULEX mission, and last December’s energy-climate package.

It is difficult to say whether this is going to be the modus operandi of the enlarged Union over the next five years. What is becoming increasingly evident is that – lacking ambitious long-term integration projects capable of concentrating the minds and energies of governments and citizens alike (as were the Single Market, the euro, and possibly even Schengen) – crises are now the real tests of the Union’s ability to act and react as one, both internally and externally.

This phenomenon emerged quite dramatically during the French EU Presidency last year, immediately after the shock of the Irish No to Lisbon, and is hardly relenting now. Are crises, in other words, turning into the potential solidarités de fait - to be patiently built up and not taken for granted - that Jean Monnet considered the essence of the European integration process?

This could well become the big challenge for the Union in the months and years to come, starting with the three summits in early April (G-20, NATO, EU-US) at which President Obama will meet and talk to his European allies and partners for the first time.




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