An unambitious exit from Temporary Protection? Fragmentation and risks ahead
The EU has extended Temporary Protection (TP) for displaced Ukrainians until 2027, while suggesting a transition towards national residence permits by then. Although pragmatic, this approach risks deepening fragmentation, fuelling onward movements and hindering Ukraine’s recovery.
On June 13, EU member states unanimously agreed to the European Commission’s proposal to extend TP, allowing millions of displaced Ukrainians to continue enjoying basic rights in the EU. Member states must soon decide on an ‘exit strategy’ to transition out of temporary protection, based on an initial Commission’s proposal.
The Commission foresees that some beneficiaries will return to Ukraine once the extension expires. It aims to support this process through the establishment of ‘Unity Hubs’, which are multipurpose centres providing information on both return and integration opportunities. However, most displaced Ukrainians are unlikely to return until safety is guaranteed. With no end to the conflict in sight, the Commission proposed that TP beneficiaries wishing to remain in the EU transition to a different residence status, either under national or EU law.
This solution offers member states considerable discretion in implementing the post-TP transition, while preserving a sense of symbolic unity. Although pragmatic, this proposal could lead to fragmentation and onward movements, reigniting tensions among member states and complicating post-war reconstruction in Ukraine. To mitigate these risks, strong standards and streamlined procedures should accompany the transition to national permits.
A fragmented post-TP landscape
Temporary protection was set to expire in March 2026 and has been renewed multiple times since its first activation in 2022. While repeated extensions create uncertainty, the Council’s unanimous agreement signals continued support to the Ukrainian people. Considering the risk of a prolonged conflict, this can be understood as a pragmatic solution. Yet, the real test for EU unity is the exit strategy from TP, as it is expected that by 2027, Ukrainians will either return home or reside in the EU under a different status.
The Commission’s proposed exit strategy does not foresee a binding EU-wide status after temporary protection. Instead, it encourages member states to facilitate the transition to national residence statuses. These include permits based on employment, education, or family reasons; or through EU legal migration instruments, such as the Blue Card Directive, the Single Permit Directive, and the Students and Researchers Directive.
These EU instruments, however, only set minimum standards, leading to divergent national practices. When it comes to permits issued under domestic legislation, eligibility criteria vary between member states, as do application procedures and the rights attached to them.
Evidence shows that member states already follow distinct national approaches in the transition to post-TP status. Some countries, like Czechia, have established new residence options for temporary protection beneficiaries. Other countries are introducing amendments to existing rules to facilitate the transition to national residence permits. By contrast, other countries have not yet introduced any policies to facilitate access to post-TP residence.
Lack of ambition generates practical and political costs
With its proposal, the Commission chose the path of least resistance, despite being aware of its practical and political risks. A binding proposal for an EU-wide status could have led to lengthy and divisive discussions. With limited financial resources and the implementation of asylum reforms high on the agenda, the monitoring and enforcement of an EU-wide post-temporary protection status could have also been difficult to ensure. Instead, the proposed exit strategy is expected to more likely receive member states’ support as it gives them licence to implement it based on domestic priorities.
This approach is in line with a consolidated pattern in EU migration policy, with member states benefitting from significant discretion despite the introduction of what are presented as common rules. The Commission’s proposal also reflects a structural ‘ambition-unity dilemma’ that the EU faces: sacrificing ambitious policy solutions to keep all member states on board.
Yet, the approach currently under consideration will lead to fragmented responses and risks generating negative spill-over effects for member states’ unity, and for Ukraine, undermining that very unity the Commission seeks to display.
Divergent rules can increase onward movements - people relocating from one host country to another - as individuals may move to member states with more accessible permits or stronger social protections. Such movements have long been contentious among member states as they affect responsibility-sharing while also putting additional pressure on an already tested Schengen system. Onward movements of Ukrainians could thus raise tensions among member states, particularly as public support for displaced Ukrainians declines.
At the same time, this approach makes return plans even more unpredictable. With Ukrainians’ return intentions also varying based on their hosting conditions, displaced Ukrainians will face uneven (dis)incentives to stay or instead return, due to the different national permits and rights attached to them. This could also make it harder for Ukraine to manage the return of its reconstruction workforce.
What way forward?
The effects of this approach could be costly for the EU, for Ukraine and, importantly, for the millions of displaced Ukrainians who face uncertainty over their long-term prospects.
Alternative solutions were available to ease pressure on national protection systems while allowing a more unified transition from temporary protection. One such option was providing access to an EU-wide long-term residence status under the Long-Term Residents Directive (LTRD). Yet, there was and continues to be no political appetite to put the LTRD at the centre of the post-TP transition.
In this context, it becomes all the more urgent for the Council to address existing risks and gaps, starting from the recommendation of clear and common transition standards. These should at least include a basic set of rights attached to national residence permits, including effective access to healthcare, education, and the labour market. This would ensure a more dignified transition, while limiting incentives for onward movements to countries with more generous support systems.
At a time when solidarity remains politically fragile and ambition scarce, clarity and coordination are not merely desirable - they are essential.
Emma Ugolini is a Programme Assistant with the European Migration and Diversity Programme at the European Policy Centre
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