Overcoming the EU’s constitutional cakeism in its relationship with the UK
The EU and UK held their first post-Brexit summit on 19 May. Following their acrimonious divorce and years of strained relations, the process of EU-UK rapprochement is well underway, including the conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership and a common understanding to work towards agreements on agri-food trade, emissions trading, and a youth experience scheme. And yet, the ambition on both sides does not match the scale of the challenges Europeans are facing, not least the acute security threat emanating from Russia.
In the EU, roadblocks to rapprochement are often attributed to rigid UK red lines and Starmer’s cautious approach on anything to do with the EU, with many expecting this caution to continue given Nigel Farage’s recent success in the local elections. But this is only part of the story: less discussed is the EU’s reluctance and cakeism in its own ranks.
Cakeism and cherry-picking
Boris Johnson famously stated that his policy on cake was “pro having it and pro eating it”, implying that the UK could continue to reap the benefits of European integration outside the EU. This was rebuffed by then European Council President Donald Tusk who noted that the UK would not be able to "cherry pick" the bits of the EU it liked. This stance very much prevailed in the negotiations and, consequently, the UK ended up outside the Single Market, with all the costs that entails.
The EU political rationale was sound at the time, given a real fear that other Member States might follow the UK if it were to get a better deal than those inside the EU – i.e. benefits without obligations. But the world has changed since then. The watershed moments of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s challenge to European security, prosperity and democracy require like-minded countries to stand together. The UK has a particular place in this coalition of the willing. Not only does it possess significant security and defence capabilities, it is a truly like-minded liberal democracy that has been at the forefront of supporting Ukraine and therefore European security. The UK is not only rowing its boat in the same direction as the EU, but sitting in the same boat, together with Ukraine.
The same cannot be said for a number of EU Member States, which, for different reasons, are not fully behind the support of Ukraine or the defence and security surge at the European level. Some are implicitly or even explicitly threatening vetoes on a number of issues, ranging from sanctions against Russia to financial support for Ukraine. These divisions are going to deepen in the coming years as more will be at stake politically and financially. This environment necessitates far-reaching and highly political decisions that put EU unity under pressure. The risk is high that ambition might be sacrificed to achieve this unity.
Coalitions of the willing
The idea of moving ahead without those who are unwilling is gaining momentum. But for many, leaving some Member States behind would threaten the foundations of European integration. The raison d'être of the integration project was often portrayed as the common provision of European public goods such as peace or sustainability, benefitting all members and even non-members. But Brexit highlighted a more hard-nosed rationale: the Single Market facilitated by the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital benefits only those who also accept the obligations that come with it. It is a club good, not a public good, and no country can have this cake if it is unwilling to commit to the common endeavor.
This logic also needs to be applied to the next major steps in integration, with possibly far-reaching implications for like-minded partners like the UK. Free-riding on strategic issues inside the EU – having your cake and eating it too – is not just a nuisance but fundamentally threatens the EU’s ability to respond to the changing international landscape. Politically, countries’ free-riding on common policies reduces the willingness of other governments and their populations to commit to more ambitious common action. It is also a financial problem, at a time of low economic growth and painful funding trade-offs. Most importantly, free-riders on the inside, who enjoy club goods without committing to much needed further common action, can hinder progress for everyone else. The EU cannot afford blockages, such as national vetoes, wherever they might come from.
Differentiated integration in a variable European geometry
In a world of club goods, the logic should be to exclude the unwilling and to include all those that are willing, with varying geometry depending on the policy area. This opens the way for countries such as the UK and Norway to be an integral part of new policy initiatives, while excluding others who are not able or willing to participate even if they are EU members. For the UK and Norway this could mean working with EU Member States towards a common defence market. Or toward integrating capital markets and finding ways to draw on the strength of UK capital markets to contribute to financing European defence.
This is tricky. It poses questions about the role of the EU institutions and carries many dangers, not least for the cohesiveness of the EU. It needs to be designed carefully, as closely aligned to current structures as possible. The latter could be a difficult pill to swallow for a UK government that continues to tread carefully on all matters relating to the EU.
But needs must: there is no feasible alternative, which is why it is happening already. Far-reaching coalitions of the willing, including EU and non-EU countries, that produce club goods in areas such as defence that can exclude the reluctant, are not a sideshow. They are becoming core to European integration and will prove even more essential in the years to come.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
Jannike Wachowiak is an external expert at the European Policy Centre and a researcher at UK in a Changing Europe.
Going forward, the EPC and Bertelsmann Stiftung will be co-hosting and designing a track 1.5 on EU-UK relations. This will bring together officials and experts from both sides to exchange ideas and test solutions in a protected environment.
