Climate change continues to make severe impacts on our economy and society. Over the past decade, weather-related disasters displaced 250 million people, and 3.6 billion people continue to live in areas of high climate vulnerability. The fact that the world is not on track to limit global warming to 1.5°C which is needed to avoid the most severe future consequences of climate change, calls for an honest discussion of the outcome of negotiations under the UN Climate Change Conference – starting with the recent COP30 – and the EU’s current and future role in these multilateral climate negotiations.
The disappointing outcomes of COP30
The outcome of the recently concluded COP30 falls far short of what is required both to halt and to adapt to climate change. It either underdelivered on the needed commitments or produced vague commitments which are difficult to interpret. Regarding the former, the failure is evident given that parties only offered lip service to the phase-out of fossil fuels – the main source of GHG emissions – and failed to agree on how to end deforestation. On the latter, new commitments on tripling climate adaptation finance by 2035 fall well short of estimated adaptation needs and did not specify any reference year for the calculation.
Climate negotiations affected by geopolitics
As COP negotiations shifted from target setting to implementation, its deficiencies became apparent. Consensus-based and opaque decision-making prevent bold progress on global climate action. More broadly, the lack of capacity to reach a consensus or the inability to influence ‘the unwilling’ to follow the trajectory set out in the Paris agreement reflects not just competing national interests, but also the polycentric nature of the contemporary global order marked by stark geopolitical rivalries.
In a world marked by wars, resurgence of protectionism, and rise of illiberalism, it is no surprise that security dilemmas and relative gains severely undermine multilateralism and concerns for the global commons. Many oil-producing countries continue to oppose the phasing out of fossil fuels while the North-South divide over how to align climate action with developmental objectives continues to delay essential progress. The withdrawal of the US from climate debates and commitments, under Trump 2.0, delivered a critical blow to the COP process. Although China remains ambitious on climate action, this is driven primarily by its exports of cleantech solutions, supported by subsidies and other measures to its industry. Finally, the EU, facing an ongoing green backlash, demonstrated a striking lack of ambition compared to the previous years, barely managing to submit their climate targets ahead of COP30.
Amid such turbulence, expecting future COPs to close both the mitigation and adaptation gaps appears unrealistic. Although they will remain crucial for ensuring accountability, there is a growing risk that they evolve into largely performative, high-level gatherings delivering minimal tangible outcomes. Encouragingly, however, parallel talks at COP30 hinted at a potential shift toward stronger plurilateral cooperation among 'coalitions of the willing', including on fossil fuel phase-out and carbon pricing.
What should the EU do?
Notwithstanding the sorry state of global affairs, including UN climate negotiations, the first, and the most difficult step is to recognise the reality of the situation is, and factor it into future actions. For the EU, it begins at home. The Union must demonstrate to its citizens, industry and the rest of the world, that it remains on track to meet its own climate commitments. It must remain committed to its 2030 and 2040 targets, establish an enabling regulatory and financial framework for its clean tech industry to flourish, and advance fair transition pathways for hard-to-abate industries, farmers and lower income households.
On the international stage, the EU should actively participate in regional and bilateral climate partnerships, including coalitions of the willing facilitated by COP30, as well as the G7 and G20. In doing so, the EU should rely on a mix of investments, while safeguarding the legitimate interests of its own industry, through instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The EU should aim to reconcile its own climate objectives with the needs of other nations, by addressing climate impacts fairly, and supporting clean energy and industrial transitions in developing countries. In the case of China, the EU needs to strike a delicate balance between safeguarding its own economic interests while exploring possibilities to enhance climate-related cooperation. Finally, given the political situation in the US, priority must be given to transatlantic partnerships with cities and states committed to ambitious climate action.
Given the US reluctance to pursue climate policies, the EU should take the lead on climate instead of abandoning such commitments – especially as competitiveness and decarbonisation can go hand-in-hand. By upholding its climate commitments, strengthening social measures to cushion the decarbonisation cost for its most vulnerable citizens, and pursuing fair and effective bilateral and regional arrangements abroad, the EU can help reinforce the rationale for global climate collaboration, which could provide fresh impetus to future COP negotiations.
Stefan Šipka is Head of Sustainable Prosperity for Europe programme and a Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre.
Pauline Gerard is a Programme Assistant in Sustainable Prosperity for Europe programme at the European Policy Centre.
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