ussia’s war against Ukraine has returned NATO to its original purpose of defending allied territory, with Europe taking a greater role in its own defence under the unofficial banner of NATO 3.0. The Alliance’s reorientation is logical and necessary. However, it becomes dangerous if NATO 3.0 is used as shorthand for a reduced U.S. conventional role in Europe, offset by promises to preserve or even expand America’s nuclear guarantees.
The assumption behind this trade-off is risky. Conventional and nuclear deterrence are not separate instruments that can be neatly exchanged. They are connected parts of the same escalation ladder. Washington cannot expect to remain fully credible in Europe by offering mainly nuclear reassurance while limiting its conventional presence.
The recent US decision not to deploy certain long-range capabilities to Europe illustrates the problem. Such systems are not merely conventional assets. Since they can hold targets deep inside Russia at risk, including elements of its tactical and strategic nuclear forces, they also strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture. Withholding them has therefore not merely reduced the Alliance’s firepower. It has also overlooked the role that conventional assets play in making nuclear deterrence credible.
This makes Washington’s position paradoxical. The United States wants Europeans to take on far more of the conventional burden, while remaining cautious about a larger European nuclear role. Nonetheless, if Washington reduces its conventional footprint in Europe and compensates by leaning more heavily on nuclear forces, it leaves itself with fewer credible options in a crisis below the nuclear threshold. That gap is what makes the formula risky. In a confrontation with Moscow, Russia could be tempted to test NATO through limited conventional pressure, while betting that Washington would be reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold.
Against this backdrop, the objective of NATO 3.0 should be a more capable European pillar within NATO, not a rushed reduction of the American role. The guiding principle should be the preservation of deterrence at both the conventional and nuclear levels, not burden shifting for its own sake. Otherwise, a rapid withdrawal of U.S. conventional capabilities could weaken nuclear deterrence as well, leaving the Alliance with fewer means to manage escalation.
This op-ed was originally published by KAS.
Juraj Majcin is a Policy Analyst with the European Policy Centre.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
