Europe in the World

The Future of Transatlantic Relations – Restoring Trust and Building a New Partnership

18 June 2003


Summary

Constructive and cooperative European Union (EU) – United States (US) relations are essential for global stability. But today transatlantic relations are in crisis, largely over the war in Iraq and more recently over the role of the United Nations (UN) and the EU in Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. The number of EU-US disagreements is multiplying and cover political, strategic, economic and social issues. One of the biggest divisions is over global governance and the role to be accorded to the UN and other multilateral institutions. European concerns, wrongly seen in the US asrising anti-Americanism, in reality reflect a tide of opposition to certain Bush administration policies. At the same time in the US, there is growing resentment of the European stance, more particularly of German and French responses to US advances.

The EU has no coherent concept of how to deal with the world’s only superpower. Too often there is a preference for bilateral as opposed to EU channels, as is most visible in UK-US relations. Today, Tony Blair has more influence in the White House than any other European leader although some question the price he pays.[i] But the current EU-US structures do not enable a serious discussion of many of the differences to take place. EU-US Summits are dismal affairs with positions stated rather than a real dialogue.

There is some evidence that the growing number and gravity of these disputes, over Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, how to deal with ‘rogue states’ and terrorism, global warming and arms control, may already be undermining the trust necessary to tackle global problems together. Furthermore, transatlantic disputes are having a major impact on European foreign and security policy, and even the process of European integration. There are doubts whether the US is still committed to a strong, united Europe speaking with one voice. Some argue that the current Bush administration is pursuing a policy of ‘divide and rule’. Even the Union’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, felt it necessary to express his concern in a speech on 7 May on the danger of the US seeking “to disaggregate Europe”. Such an approach, he stated. “would not only contradict generations of American wisdom, it would also be profoundly misguided”.

Two major geopolitical earthquakes - the collapse of communism and the US response to 9/11 - have had an inevitable impact on transatlantic relations. As the EU has grown in size and stature (single currency, enlargement) it has taken on more responsibility for security in its neighbourhood. By and large the US has been supportive of this process, while stressing the continued importance of NATO. At the same time there is the reality of a growing divergence between America’s perception of its moral leadership and European perceptions of a military-minded America obsessed with rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Yet, despite all these problems it is essential that the EU and US find common ground to tackle an ever more complicated global agenda. The two blocks dominate world trade and provide by far the lion’s share of economic, development and technical assistance. They account for over 70% of global expenditure on defence. They have worked together successfully in the Balkans and elsewhere. They must continue to seek to work together as partners of choice.

This report, based on a series of EPC working group meetings involving experts from both sides of the Atlantic, assesses the nature of current EU-US disputes, considers public attitudes and the bureaucratic machinery responsible for EU-US relations. It suggests an agenda to rebuild trust and develop a genuine partnership.

Key Recommendations

  • Cool the rhetoric. Both sides need to stop hurling insults and treat each other like adult partners. As Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar put it, “we need more Powell and less Rumsfeld”.
  • No vindictiveness. Transatlantic relations are too important to be harmed by spite or vindictiveness. Threats of boycotts should be firmly rejected by political leaders on both sides. Statesmanship is required. The EU and US need to work together, under the political authority of the UN, to rebuild Iraq.
  • Work together where possible; differ when necessary; but try and narrow the areas of divergence.
  • Continue the good work in areas of cooperation (terrorism, Balkans, Afghanistan, HIV/Aids in Africa).
  • Jointly promote the Middle East peace process. The US and EU are the two most important members of the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and the UN) and need to follow through on the Road Map despite attempts to derail it by extremists.
  • Revamp the summit process. Principals should meet alone at least twice a year.
  • Keep talks flowing in the WTO. Ensure a successful outcome at Cancun as the basis for progress in achieving the aims of the Doha Development Agenda.
  • Bolster relations of Congress and the European Parliament. There should be more exchanges and more use of video links.
  • Exchange views on global governance (especially performance of the IFIs and WTO), threat perceptions and how to deal with ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states, as well as terrorism and WMD.
  • Encourage business and other special interests to network more closely. Commit to supporting the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD).
  • Seek agreement on new economic agenda including the digital economy, aviation, financial services, competition policy, food standards, and regulatory frameworks, e.g. accountancy standards.
  • US should reiterate its unambiguous support for a strong, united Europe.
  • The EU needs to find the political will to move forward in CFSP.
  • Both sides to ensure smooth EU-NATO interface with aim of complementary action.

Introduction

The 1990s were not exactly a decade of transatlantic bliss. Indeed many of the current disputes have their origins in the 1990s when, for most of the decade, the Clinton administration faced a hostile Congress, largely uninterested in foreign policy, and European governments were deeply concerned with the ‘hands off’ approach of both the Bush Senior administration and the new Clinton administration towards the Balkan conflict. While George Bush senior won plaudits in Europe for his statesmanlike handling of the collapse of communism he was unwilling to engage the US in the Balkans. As Secretary of State James Baker remarked, “we do not have a dog in that fight”. Clinton continued this non-interventionist strategy, and as a result, the 1992-94 period was a time of major crisis with the Europeans and Americans pursuing different policies in the Balkans. Eventually the US intervened militarily to secure the Dayton agreement and later again intervened to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Peace in the Balkans finally only came through US-EU cooperation – not competition.

Both, George Bush and Bill Clinton recognized the growing potential of the EU as a partner for the US and were keen to provide some structure to EU-US relations. But the structures established in 1990 and 1995 were never given the necessary unstinting political support on either side of the Atlantic to ensure success.  The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration committed the US and EU to regular political consultations at all levels (biannual summits, ministerial and senior official as well as working group meetings).[ii]

In 1995, the US and EU moved a stage further with the signing of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) proposing joint action in four major fields

  • promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world;
  • responding to global challenges;
  • contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations;
  • and building bridges across the Atlantic[iii].

There is little doubt that the bureaucratic structures underpinning the NTA have been useful in discussing EU-US disputes and even in helping to resolve some issues, mainly in the trade field. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), which was launched in 1998 to progressively improve access to markets and eliminate trade barriers between the transatlantic partners, is a visible manifestation of this new cooperation. But there has been no real substantive discussion at the highest political level, for example on global governance or threat perception, partly due to the inability on the EU side to speak with one voice on sensitive political, security and economic issues.[iv] The rotating six monthly EU presidency has not been conducive to promoting such a dialogue and many Member States, not just the UK, thus prefer operating through bilateral channels. Indeed Member State ambassadors are often judged at home by the length of audience they secure for their president or prime minister with the president of the US, with visits to Camp David and Bush’s Crawford ranch counting as bonus points. On the US side, successive administrations have not viewed the EU as their prime or even principal interlocutor on foreign and security policy issues. Furthermore, the various attempts to involve business, consumers, environmentalists and others in structured ‘people to people’ dialogues have also had little sustained success.

Despite the difficulties on the structural side, the Clinton administration was overall pro-European. It had many people in its senior ranks with direct experience of the EU and Bill Clinton himself was temperamentally inclined to European ideas and solutions. But there were disputes in several areas, including tackling ‘rogue states’, global warming, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the failure to ratify the CTBT and the treaty banning land mines. It is therefore wrong to believe that EU problems with the US began when George W Bush took over the White House in January 2001.

There was considerable sneering in Europe at George W. Bush the candidate. He was widely portrayed in the European media as an unsophisticated cowboy. On taking office, these prejudices were confirmed as the new administration seemed to Europeans to go out of its way to denounce the Kyoto protocol, sabotage the ICC, refuse to sign or ratify arms control agreements and proceed undeterred with the national missile defence programme. European concerns were further heightened by the new administration downgrading the importance of the Middle East peace process and North Korea, which were both Clinton priorities. Global institutions were scorned. The best spin on working through international institutions came from Richard Haass, Head of Planning in the State Department, who spoke of ‘a la carte multilateralism’. As far as Europe was concerned, there were very few in the senior ranks of the administration with any direct experience of the EU, with US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick being a notable exception. The firsthand experience of Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, etc, primarily dates back to the Europe of the Cold War, when NATO and bilateral relations played the dominant role. The new administration showed little desire to interact with the EU, a body that seemed to many to merely cause problems (e.g. stopping GE/Honeywell merging, defeating the US in the WTO and preventing the import of GMO foodstuffs) with little in return. It was thus no surprise when the Bush administration unilaterally decided to reduce the number of summits with the EU to one per year. Congress also showed little interest in maintaining close relations with the European Parliament despite its increasing influence.

9/11 - The Day That Changed America

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed the US in a fundamental manner  – but inevitably they did not have a similar impact on Europe, being well used to decades of terrorism. There was of course an immediate and genuine outpouring of shared grief and outrage epitomized by the famous headline in Le Monde ‘We are all Americans’ and the willingness to invoke article V of the NATO Treaty. There was also support for the measured US response in defeating the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. For its part, the EU responded swiftly by agreeing on the introduction of a European arrest warrant, the adoption of a common definition of terrorism, agreeing new international legal instruments, combating the funding of terrorism and strengthening air security.[v] But few Europeans really understood the mix of angst, desire for revenge and uncertainty pervading American society. Few Europeans grasped just how much 9/11 affected US thinking, especially on security policy. For the first time since Pearl Harbour, Americans had a sense of their own vulnerability. Bush declared a ‘war on terror’ and overnight national security became top of the agenda, domestic and foreign.

European hopes that 9/11 would temper US hostility to multilateralism were soon dashed. By early 2002 EU-US divergences became clearer with most European governments distancing themselves from the President’s ‘axis of evil’ speech and the new openly proclaimed pre-emptive strike doctrine.  Many Europeans doubted, whether military might alone could defeat terrorism or tackle the roots of terrorism. The US talked of a ‘war on terrorism’; Europeans talked of ‘a fight against terrorism’. Americans rebuked Europeans for not taking defence seriously and pointed to the huge transatlantic gap in military capabilities. Also, the US has not experienced war like continental Europeans.  Precision bombing from a distance with American deaths counted in tens does not compare with European wars with deaths in millions.

A related dispute concerned so-called ‘rogue states’, a term many Europeans shied away from using, preferring a policy of conditional engagement rather than a policy of isolation and sanctions. Such disputes, especially over US legislation on Cuba and Iran, had soured EU-US relations for several years. Oddly, there has never been a high-level EU-US discussion on the nature of the new security threats and how to deal with them. Instead there have been countless communiqués and statements pledging both sides ‘to combat terrorism and tackle the problems of WMD’. With the real threat of terrorists acquiring WMD, the US and the EU have to continue to develop practical and effective ways to act together on this issue.

What Common Values and Interests?

During the Cold War common interests and shared values were widely assumed between Europe and the US. The two blocs shared the same commitment to democratic institutions, liberal values, human rights and regional stability. They had a common interest in an open international trading system, access to world energy supplies and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But there are many who question whether the EU and US still share a number of values, pointing to sharp differences on the death penalty, gun culture, violence, health care, social and economic models.[vi] The growing influence of religion has also been highlighted as a major cultural difference impinging on politics.

Robert Kagan has described two worlds, that of a Europe which is “entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realisation of Kant’s Perpetual Peace”. And that of the US which “remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might”. He suggests that these differences are likely to endure.[vii] Francis Fukuyama, another close observer of transatlantic relations, wrote “The End of History” 13 years ago, declaring “the triumph of common Euro-American values”. He now writes of the “deep differences” within the Atlantic Alliance and emphasizes that the current split in transatlantic relations is “not a transitory problem” as the US is at a different point in its history with regard to international institutionalism and international law.[viii]

On the European side, Chris Patten has pleaded for the US to return to supporting the international "rule book" that it helped establish after 1945 to promote democracy, the rule of law and the opening of international markets. It had been a "pretty successful formula”, and one that people on both sides of the Atlantic have found it easy to identify with. So why, he asked, did some people now want to abandon it?The real future challenge for the US and EU, therefore, will be to try and better understand each other’s interests and concerns; and to make the global “rule book” more successful.[ix] In a recent interview with the Financial Times Javier Solana attributed the widening gulf between the EU and US to a confrontation between the religious vision of world affairs in the White House and the secular vision of the Europeans. Solana stated that “it is a sort of binary model, it is all or nothing. For us Europeans, it is difficult to deal with because we are secular. We do not see the world in such black and white terms.”[x]

Certainly, since 9/11 George Bush has divided the world into ‘good-versus-evil’ and asked countries if they “are with us or against us”. Religious exhortations abound in his speeches.  For example, in his State of the Union address of February 2003 he stated that, “the liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity.”  Furthermore, in the week after the terrorist attacks Bush stated in a speech, that “this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.” This comment caused concern because of its connotation linking the war on terror to the Christian medieval holy wars against Muslims.  It is highly doubtful that any European head of state would use such rhetoric.

US attitudes to Europe

The Iraq war has had a significant impact on how Americans view Europe. A 2002 poll conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund showed that Europeans and Americans shared a similar worldview in many respects. Americans preferred working through multilateral channels as much as Europeans. A clear majority of Americans would have preferred the US to have UN support for fighting in Iraq.[xi]  But with the wrangling in the UN Security Council over Iraq, and prompted by administration criticism of France and Germany, public attitudes also changed. Britain was perceived as a far more reliable ally than France or Germany, prompting jibes about “cheese eating surrender monkeys” and “freedom fries”.

Congress rarely thinks of the EU as an entity. In addition to the well-known adversity to foreign travel, only a handful of Congressmen have regular contact with their European counterparts. Europe-bashing is popular and brings some media attention. The only Commissioners that receive good audiences on the Hill are Lamy, Monti and Fischler because they clearly speak for a united Europe and can affect US interests.

Views in the current administration are not dissimilar to those on the Hill. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been particularly critical of old Europe (critical of US policy on Iraq) compared to new Europe (those supportive of US policy). He seemed to relish the disarray in the Union caused by the Gang of 8 and Vilnius 10 letters.[xii]

Leaving Iraq aside, there is no single US reaction to the EU. There are still those who broadly support the twin goals of widening and deepening. Others would prefer just widening and with Turkey included. Some are skeptical as to whether the EU can really move forward as a cohesive foreign policy actor. But there is a growing number who doubt whether such a move would be in US interests. They point to the problems the US has faced when the EU has managed to speak with one voice (ICC, Kyoto, trade) and suggest the US should rather intensify its policy of divide and rule. What this implies is that the EU should do more to convince the US of the idea that a uniting of Europe does not come at the expense of the US.

European Attitudes Towards the US

European attitudes towards the US have changed dramatically due to the Iraq crisis. In 2002, 75% in Britain, 63 % in France and 61% in Germany viewed the US favourably.[xiii] In 2003, with the approach of war, there were massive anti-war demonstrations throughout Europe. Interestingly the largest anti-war demonstrations occurred in the UK, Spain and Italy, the three countries that gave Bush the strongest support on the Iraq issue. According to an opinion poll by the German Forsa Institute published in April 2003, 90% of French and Germans have lost their respect for the US because of the war in Iraq. The Pew Research Center published a poll on March 18, 2003, which found that anti-war sentiment and disapproval of President Bush’s international policies continued to erode America’s image among Europeans including countries that were part of “the coalition of the willing.” In Britain, favourable views of the US have declined from 75% to 48% in only a year. In Poland, positive views of the US have fallen to 50% from about 80% six months earlier.[xiv] These findings were confirmed in a Sofres poll of 12 May 2003 that showed Europeans even further disenchanted with US foreign policy after the end of the Iraqi war. In only one country (UK) were there more than 40% with a favourable view of the US. In the Middle East no country managed even 10% - results, which are deeply alarming.

There have been bouts of anti-Americanism in Europe ever since the 1950s. General de Gaulle proclaimed in 1965 that the “United States is the greatest danger in the world today to peace”, and left the NATO military structure in 1966. Opposition to the Vietnam war, deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, and Reagan’s talk of the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ caused condemnation of the US.[xv]  However, opposition to the policies of the current US administration has reached new heights. It will be important, therefore, to reflect on how to increase civil society exchanges, including two-way educational scholarships, increasing think tank and media contacts.

European governments have been divided in their response to Iraq and other issues affecting EU-US relations. The UK has traditionally tried to maintain its ‘special relationship’ with Washington at the same time as seeking to act as a bridge between the US and Europe. Germany, a traditional, uncritical ally of the US during the Cold War, caused consternation in America when its Chancellor successfully fought an election campaign on opposition to war in Iraq. France, usually the pack leader in opposition to US hegemony, also angered Washington with its stance in the UNSC. In the absence of consensus between these three states, it was impossible for the 15 to reach agreement on anything beyond general support for the UN. Apart from Iraq, member states have not always demonstrated solidarity or coherence on other issues. There have been divisions within the EU on how to respond to US plans for missile defence, to US attempts to sign bilateral treaties with accession states exempting them from the ICC and on trade sanctions. Member States’ missions in Washington usually give preference to bilateral issues over EU issues, a habit that is not exactly conducive to demonstrating EU cohesion to US interlocutors. The onus must be on the EU to improve its ability to speak with one voice.

A Solid Economic and Trade relationship

Despite political differences, the US and Europe continue to enjoy a very healthy and solid economic and trade relationship. Every day the two sides turn over more than 1.25 billion euros. Transatlantic trade comprises approximately 20 % of each side's overall foreign trade. European exports to the US totaled 260 billion euro in 2000 while imports from the US amounted to 195 billion euro. Mutual investments have contributed even more than actual trade to economic integration: more than 60 % of foreign investments in the US come from the EU and roughly 45 % of US foreign investments go to the EU. Furthermore, 7 million Americans owe their livelihoods to European investors; the corresponding European figure is 6 million.

While trade conflicts regularly hit the headlines, they really only affect a very small percentage (1-2%) of the total trade flow. Given the size of the trade relationship it is important to recognize that there will always be some disputes. The trick will be to identify possible new disputes in good time and try and seek common ground. This applies particularly to ‘new disputes’ such as GMOs, competition policy, drugs, accounting standards, banking and insurance. Threats of boycotts should be firmly rejected. The transatlantic business community must lobby for politicians to try and narrow their disputes and conduct EU-US relations in a more adult manner.

A New Partnership

The EU and US must learn to respect their different views and agree to tackle major problems together. Tony Blair warned on 25 March 2003 that after Iraq there would need to be “a reckoning about EU-US relations”. He argued that “it is not correct that the American administration wants to pursue a unilateralist path without care for the rest of the world�If we are going to have a strategic partnership between Europe and America, we have to work out the basis of that and how we make progress on issues that are difficult between us.”[xvi]  Similarly, Christopher Patten in an interview with the Financial Times stressed that the transatlantic relationship can still be rescued if Britain and France pull together. In his view, the differences between France and the UK are much less than the disputes over Iraq suggest and that “Europe will only matter internationally if Britain and France work together.”[xvii]

At present Bush is riding high as a result of the swift US military victory against Iraq. But it will take much longer to win the peace and the US will need both the EU and UN if it is to be successful in this endeavour. The US has to repair its damaged position in the Muslim world and has to convince those nations that the war on Iraq was one of liberation and not one of imperialism. It is therefore of great importance that Bush engages Europe and the UN as partners in the reconstruction of Iraq and demonstrates both to Europe and the Middle East visible progress on the Israel-Palestinian dispute. The EU and US must also sit down and have a frank discussion on how best to tackle new security threats and in particular the relevance of multilateral institutions. An agenda for such a discussion should include:

  • Iran (and other so-called rogue states) with the EU seeking to demonstrate the validity of its ‘constructive engagement’ approach versus the US approach of isolation and sanctions.
  • Terrorism with the EU emphasising that there can be no quick victory in the fight against terrorism, that considerable patience and resolve are required, and that only a multi-faceted approach can succeed.
  • Proliferation with the EU urging the US to sign up to the whole range of arms control treaties in order not to undermine them. At the same time the EU must be prepared to take action in the event of states flouting the treaties.[xviii]

The importance of the transatlantic relationship should necessitate more not fewer summit meetings. The president of the US and the presidents of the Council and Commission should meet at least twice a year without any others present. Too often summits are stage-managed set pieces with no real dialogue. These face-to-face meetings could be supplemented by video conferences.

Meanwhile the EU and US need to continue their cooperation in other areas including Afghanistan and the Balkans. It is vital to maintain stability in SE Europe and tackle the unresolved status issues such as Kosovo. In the short term, the EU and the US have an obligation to ensure the success of the Doha Development round. Trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and market access barriers should be reduced and if possible eliminated. The transatlantic allies need to increase efforts to bring about a successful Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003. Both the EU and US also need to increase their support for developing countries and tackling global disease and poverty.

Conclusion

The transatlantic relationship is under the greatest strain since 1945.  Still, this partnership remains indispensable. The existing community of shared interests and shared values needs to be transformed into a community of action. Both sides have to overcome the distrust that occurred over Iraq and look to the future. The range of pressing global problems means that the EU and US have to act in a statesmanlike manner. Vision and understanding are called for. Javier Solana, in a speech at Harvard University on April 7, 2003, made a plea to both sides to work together to “sustain and strengthen a world based on rules. US dominance through force would be a return to the politics of the cave man”.

A new enlarged EU will inevitably be preoccupied with internal problems. But enlargement will also bring in a group of countries which instinctively see the US as a force for good in world affairs. This will not be uncritical support because the accession states, like current EU member states, are firmly committed to multilateral institutions. But this enlarged Europe has the opportunity to develop a new partnership with the US. A precondition will be a successful outcome to the Convention on the Future of Europe, especially progress on CFSP and ESDP. At present the emphasis is on improving the structures but even more important will be the sustained development of political will to act in a united manner.

If the EU succeeds in its endeavours then the US will need to make a psychological adjustment to accept the EU as a global partner, the partner of choice in tackling international problems. It will not be an easy adjustment on either side. But the stakes are too high to fail.

Dr Fraser Cameron is Director of Studies at the EPC and author of ‘US Foreign Policy Since the End of the Cold War’, Routledge, 2002.

Mirjam Dittrich is a Policy Analyst at the EPC.

 


[i] See Roderick Braithwaite’s trenchant critique of the ‘special relationship’ in Prospect, May 2003

[ii] The flowery Declaration committed the EU and US “to further strengthen their partnership in order to: support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual liberty, safeguard peace and promote international security, by cooperating with other nations against aggression and coercion, by contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the world and by reinforcing the role of the United Nations.”  Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, 1990, www.europa.eu.int

[iii] The NTA confidently affirmed,e that “the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century. For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace and prosperity for ourselves and for the world. Together, we helped transform adversaries into allies and dictatorships into democracies. Together, we built institutions and patterns of cooperation that ensured our security and economic strength. These are epic achievements”.

[iv] See testimony of Javier Solana to the Convention on the Future of Europe, Dehaene Working Group on foreign and security policy, 15.10.2001

[v] Special European Council, 20.9.2001

[vi] See the popularity of Michael Moore’s ‘Bowling for Colombine’ in Europe

[vii] Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy Review No. 113, June/July 2002

[viii] Francis Fukuyama, "U.S. vs. Them: Opposition to American policies must not become the chief passion in global politics," The Washington Post, September 11, 2002.

[ix] Speech by the Chris Patten at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, 3 October 2002.

[x] ‘Solana fears widening gulf between EU and US’, Financial Times, 8 January, 2003.

[xi] Worldviews 2002, European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, The German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

[xii] The Gang of 8 referred to an open letter backing US policy towards Iraq without consulting France or Germany or the Greek Presidency, which was initiated by the Spanish Premier, José Aznar and signed by the UK, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland on 30 January 2003. On 7 February 2003, shortly after the United Nations Security Council meeting addressed by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Vilnius 10, composed of Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia pledged in a joint letter to support the United States position on Iraq.

[xiii] The Pew Research Center, www.people-press.org

[xiv] The Pew Research Center, opinion poll released on 18 March 2003, www.people-press.org

[xv] Interestingly, anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism are at opposite ends of the political scale. European anti-Americanism is mainly to be found on the left, American anti-Europeanism on the right.

[xvi] Tony Blair Downing Street Press Conference, 25.03.03, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3347.asp

[xvii] Financial Times, 24.03.03, Interview with External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten.

[xviii] See also EPC Issue paper number one ‘An EU Strategic Concept’

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