From the Gulf to Ukraine, modern warfare is revealing a new cost equation that Europe must act on quickly to deter future aggression.
The war now unfolding across Iran and the Gulf is revealing a defining feature of warfare previously discussed in How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision. Cheap drones, missiles and mines are imposing costs on advanced militaries that are orders of magnitude higher than the price of the weapons used.
Across the region, relatively inexpensive drones and missiles are forcing the United States and its Gulf partners to expend some of their most advanced and expensive defensive systems. Iranian one-way attack drones such as the Shahed-136 cost roughly $20,000 to $50,000 each. Yet defending against them often requires interceptor missiles costing millions of dollars. Patriot interceptors cost roughly $4 million each, while a THAAD interceptor can cost $12–15 million.
Even the Iranian ballistic missiles these systems are designed to defeat, such as variants of the Fateh-110 series, are estimated to cost only a few hundred thousand dollars each.
The imbalance does not stop there. The sensor systems that underpin missile defence networks are even more expensive. The AN/TPY-2 radar that supports the THAAD system can cost upwards of $1 billion. Yet two were recently disabled by Iranian drones costing roughly $30,000 each – a cost-exchange ratio of more than 30,000 to one.
The lesson is not simply that cheap systems can defeat expensive ones. It’s also that vital expensive systems must be protected by cheaper defensive layers such as counter-drone systems.
This cost asymmetry is already placing strain on Western arsenals. Iran’s strategy relies on launching large numbers of relatively cheap drones and missiles in mixed salvos to stretch defensive systems and consume interceptor inventories.
Even when attacks are intercepted, they still impose costs. Every interceptor fired must be replaced through complex supply chains that can take years to replenish, while the attacker can produce additional drones quickly using commercial components and relatively simple manufacturing processes.
The maritime domain reveals an even clearer example of this dynamic.
The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply. Yet disrupting this chokepoint does not require a conventional naval clash. A handful of naval mines costing a few thousand dollars each can force insurers and shipping companies to halt traffic. Clearing those mines requires extensive naval operations involving minesweepers, surveillance aircraft and warships costing millions of dollars per day to deploy.
In this environment, the side that can impose the highest costs on its opponent while keeping its own costs low gains a powerful advantage.
This dynamic is already visible in the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have used inexpensive drones and precision weapons to destroy Russian tanks, artillery and naval vessels worth millions. They have also pioneered low-cost counter-drone systems, including interceptor drones costing only a few thousand dollars.
Ukraine’s battlefield innovation demonstrates that relatively small forces equipped with mass-produced precision systems can impose disproportionate costs on a larger adversary.
For decades, technological superiority in warfare belonged largely to those who could afford the most expensive platforms – stealth aircraft, advanced missiles and sophisticated sensors. Today, cheap drones, commercial electronics, artificial intelligence and satellite navigation have flattened that technological pyramid.
Precision is no longer rare nor expensive. It can be delivered cheaply and at scale. In many scenarios, this new cost asymmetry favours the defender.
For Europe, this shift offers both a warning and an opportunity. Russia still possesses a large military and substantial stockpiles of missiles and artillery. But Ukraine demonstrates that a defender equipped with large numbers of low-cost precision systems can impose enormous costs on an invading force. The challenge for Europe is to structure its defence investments around this new economic logic.
Europe should:
- Dramatically scale up its ability to produce and rapidly adapt drones and loitering munitions. Ukraine now produces millions of drones annually while European production capacity remains far lower.
- Invest heavily in cost-effective counter-drone technologies. Shooting multi-million-euro interceptors at low-cost drones is not sustainable. High-value systems such as missile-defence radars must be protected by layered counter-drone defences including jammers, interceptor drones and directed-energy systems.
- Accelerate the adoption of distributed operational concepts. Rather than concentrating large formations that can be easily targeted, modern militaries must disperse sensors, weapons and command systems across a networked battlefield.
- Shorten its defence innovation cycle. In modern warfare, adaptation measured in years is far too slow. Ukrainian drone designers routinely update systems within weeks.
A Russia contemplating aggression against Europe should face not only NATO’s high-end military power but also a dense network of drones, sensors and precision weapons capable of imposing enormous costs on any invading force.
If Europe invests wisely and builds these capabilities with urgency, this new cost asymmetry can rapidly shift deterrence in its favour.
Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre.
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