US operation in Venezuela: Why Taiwan is not ‘next’
The US attack on Venezuela has triggered speculation that Taiwan could be next. With the use of force becoming more visible and enforcement of international norms more selective, such comparisons are unsurprising.
The key question is whether Venezuela meaningfully alters China’s calculus on Taiwan by accelerating plans or shifting timelines. A closer look suggests that while such events may influence narratives and perceptions, they do not alter the structural drivers guiding Beijing’s approach. The Taiwan issue continues to move to a different rhythm.
China’s response to Venezuela has been primarily rhetorical. By condemning US “unilateral bullying”, defending sovereignty and opposing external interference, Beijing has sought a narrative advantage, particularly in the Global South. This reinforces China’s preferred vision of global governance while portraying the United States as hegemonic. At the same time, China’s statements have remained restrained. Beijing has avoided commitment to assistance or intervention, consistently invoking non-interference and stressing that Venezuela should manage its internal affairs. Even with an “all-weather” partnership and strong oil ties, Venezuelan crude accounts for only around 4–5% of China’s total imports.
US actions may bolster China’s narrative positioning but do little to affect the realities of a cross-strait contingency, where operational constraints are decisive. Despite rapid modernisation, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not widely assessed to be fully prepared for a high-risk amphibious operation. Persistent limitations include joint force integration, logistics and sustaining combat operations. These impose hard constraints on Beijing, regardless of international shifts.
Beijing is also careful to avoid parallels between Venezuela and Taiwan. Official statements frame Venezuela as an international crisis, while Taiwan is described as a domestic matter. This framing is central to China’s legal and historical justification for pressure on the island. Recent PLA exercises conducted around Taiwan, involving air, naval, missile and joint command elements, reinforce this framing. They aim to normalise a heightened military presence and erode the median line and treat cross-strait pressure as an internal issue rather than an international security question.
More fundamentally, China’s approach to Taiwan is shaped more by domestic conditions than by external precedent. Party stability, economic performance and risk management sit at the core of Beijing’s calculus. At a time of slower growth, structural economic adjustment and heightened sensitivity to social stability, any escalation is weighed against its implications for regime cohesion. US actions in Venezuela may signal a willingness to use force in pursuit of narrower interests, but they do not materially alter China’s assessment of the costs and risks of a Taiwan contingency.
Events in the Western Hemisphere are therefore a poor proxy for developments in the Taiwan Strait. While Venezuela may provide Beijing with rhetorical leverage and complicate international debates on norms and intervention, it does not make Taiwan ‘next’. Scenarios involving Taiwan remain bounded by distinct military, operational and domestic constraints. Claims of imminent acceleration misread both China’s priorities and capabilities.
The more likely trajectory is continuity: sustained pressure through calibrated military signalling, expanded exercises and legal–political framing, alongside an incremental effort to close remaining capability gaps.
Elixabete Arrieta is a Junior Policy Analyst in the Europe in the World Programme.
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