What Moscow learned from its drone breach of Poland
When Polish and NATO forces shot down Russian drones entering Polish airspace on 9–10 September, it was a test of Europe’s air defences in the age of mass precision. Russia flew 19 drones into Poland to probe seams, observe NATO’s response, and gauge the Alliance’s resolve. Warsaw’s rapid scramble of fighters and activation of air defences worked as intended. And Moscow learned a lot.
First, NATO’s integrated air defence is effective and ready. Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, German Patriots, and allied ISR fused rapidly to stop the incursion.
Second, NATO’s response came at an unsustainable cost since million-euro interceptors were fired at drones costing roughly €20,000 each. Hitting a pin with a sledgehammer sends a message but also reveals a vulnerability.
In modern conflict, precision is cheap for the attacker but costly to defend against. In Ukraine, €20,000 drones have triggered the launch of €3 million Patriot missiles, like those activated for Poland. Launching hundreds of cheap drones can force NATO to burn through its supply of interceptors. Once ready interceptors run dry, that sector is naked to aerial attacks while reloading. And once NATO’s missile depots empty, Europe’s vulnerability grows. For the adversary, it’s simple arithmetic.
But Europe already has a solution.
Directed energy weapons (DEWs) are no longer science fiction; they are critical capabilities for the age of mass precision. It can cost just €1–€10 to down a drone with a laser, even less with a microwave pulse. These systems strike at light speed, disabling multiple drones simultaneously, and causing minimal collateral damage. Several are already in service. France’s HELMA-P protected the 2024 Paris Olympics, while UK, Italian, and German versions proved reliable in tests. Such boutique capabilities must become standard tools on the frontline fast.
Scrambling F-35s and Patriots was necessary, but the future lies in layered defences where the cheapest adequate system fires first. Airburst cannons, compact counter-drone missiles like Sweden’s Nimbrix, electronic warfare and DEWs should take the brunt, freeing expensive missiles and fighter jets to tackle ballistic and hypersonic missile threats.
The third lesson was that NATO will intercept the hardware but hesitate on the politics. As the EPC’s Paul Taylor noted in the Guardian, Russia’s drone incursion was less about hitting targets than testing Europe’s political resolve. The muted response showed Moscow that while outrage is plentiful, consequences are scarce. Despite Article 4 consultations and a bolstered NATO air defence posture, Europe struggles to summon the political will to impose costs on Russia. That makes it more likely that we’ll see more such probes in the future.
Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre.
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