Europe must lead, not give in to Trump’s illusions of peace
Russia is not interested in peace negotiations; it is playing for time. Europe must end the cycle in which Trump defines the overall objectives for Ukraine, and Europe scrambles to provide the means to achieve this. Europe should lead. Rather than discussing security guarantees for a hypothetical peace, we must consider how to stop the actual war.
At the Alaska summit on 15 August 2025, US President Donald Trump tried to reframe the entire debate on ending the war in Ukraine. Instead of focusing on holding Moscow accountable and pressing for an immediate ceasefire, he shifted the conversation to a vague talk of a “broader peace agreement.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron made clear at the White House that achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine must remain the priority. Yet, in the name of preserving transatlantic unity and avoiding an easy victory for Moscow, they reluctantly embraced Trump’s new approach—for the time being.
Once again, Europe has slipped into its familiar pattern, with Trump setting the strategic goals for Ukraine and Europe scrambling to deliver the means to achieve it; the new scheme under which Europeans pay for US-made weapons bound for Ukraine serves as a prime example. The deference shown to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the White House this week was particularly dangerous and undignified. Trump urged Europeans to prepare “security guarantees” for Ukraine on the assumption that Russia is serious about peace. But where exactly is the peace to guarantee? Deterring future aggression does matter, but the urgent challenge is halting Russia’s war today.
Drawn-out negotiations with Moscow will not bring us closer to peace. On the contrary, such a process will only allow Russia to continue bombing Ukrainian cities, grabbing more land, abducting children, and executing prisoners of war without paying a higher price for it. Rather than waiting for the outcome of Trump’s empty peace process, Europe should focus on strengthening Ukraine’s battlefield position so it can eventually negotiate from a position of strength.
Trump is acting as Putin’s envoy
The real issue is time horizons. Trump shifts his goals almost daily. One day he pushes for sanctions on Russia, the next he demands a ceasefire, and then suddenly comes up with a “sweeping peace deal” that spares Moscow any real pressure. His focus is on quick wins, headlines, and receiving a Nobel Peace Prize. Ukraine, by contrast, is fighting for its survival as independent nation. Ukraine needs American military intelligence, weaponry, and a favourable sanctions regime; therefore, they cannot afford a rift with the Trump administration. The Europeans know well that Moscow cannot be trusted. Yet to keep Washington engaged they feel compelled to indulge Trump and his chaotic diplomacy.
Putin is playing a long game and has never hidden his ultimate objective to deny Ukraine independent statehood and a Euro-Atlantic future. That is why he, too, plays along with Trump, as he did in Alaska when he cleverly echoed Trump’s famous line that the war would never have happened if Trump had been president at the time. For Putin, committing to a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodimir President Zelenskyy would be problematic. He has repeatedly branded Zelenskyy as an illegitimate leader, and sitting down with him would implicitly hand Kyiv a political victory.
Yet neither can Moscow risk alienating Trump. Therefore, instead of the promised high-level summit, we will see attempts by Moscow to play for time without committing to talks with Ukraine at the presidential level. This approach allows Moscow to wage war without consequences, while accusing Ukraine of refusing to compromise.
Putin’s reported “offer” to freeze the war in exchange for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk in exchange for a frozen front in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, labelled by US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff as a “gamechanger”, cannot be regarded as a serious compromise either. Moscow is fully aware that Ukraine cannot cede this territory, as doing so would not only violate its constitution, but also open potential new lines for future Russian advances.
Trump’s embrace of Russia’s position on Ukraine’s NATO future is also reckless. On Fox News, he suggested Ukraine should remain a “buffer state”, a statement akin to the Kremlin’s propaganda playbook, according to which NATO “expansion” was the root cause of the war. However, if European history has thought us a lesson, it is that “buffers” never last—they are usually overrun by expansionist powers. Therefore, it is key that NATO allies stick to the Alliance’s open-door policy, as well as to Ukraine’s NATO future, which is enshrined in several NATO summit declarations. Unlike any other frontier, NATO borders are the only ones Moscow has consistently respected.
Yet Trump is issuing contradictory statements on the kind of security guarantees Washington is willing to offer to Kyiv, ranging from Article 5-style commitments, to the vague prospects of coordination of European forces on the ground, to air support. This approach reveals that Trump does not grasp the full extent of Russia’s determination to bring Kyiv back under its control. US signals that it will not provide real security guarantees to Ukraine or block its NATO future are music to the Kremlin’s ears.
This exposes a deeper flaw in Trump’s foreign policy. Unlike past US administrations that leaned on prominent foreign policy thinkers, from Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski to Madeleine Albright, or even John Bolton and Fiona Hill in his first term, today Trump surrounds himself with loyalists who lack any serious foreign expertise. His approach is improvised, impulsive, and detached from strategy.
Europe is now confronted with an American president who has abandoned the long-standing US doctrine of preventing Russia from dominating the European continent. Therefore, European leaders must stop merely reacting to Trump’s improvisations and start leading the discussion with their own strategy.
What Europe should be doing
First and foremost, this means increasing pressure on Russia to push it toward a ceasefire and genuine negotiations. Besides stepping up military aid for Kyiv, the Coalition of the Willing led by France and the United Kingdom should deploy to Ukraine in support and enabling roles even before a ceasefire is reached. Such presence should range from strengthening Ukrainian air defences and assisting with military logistics to deploying contingents north of Kyiv to deter a potential land attack from Belarussian territory. Such a deterrence force in Odessa may also be in order. These steps would free up more Ukrainian forces for the front line.
Second, Europe should increase pressure on Moscow also in the financial domain by making clear that Russian assets will be seized if a ceasefire is not reached and genuine negotiations do not begin within a certain timeframe. If the Kremlin refuses to comply, parts of those assets should be confiscated step by step. Endless disputes over legal technicalities only delay action and weaken Europe’s credibility as a global actor.
Third, as part of a potential mission to protect a ceasefire, the Coalition of the Willing should focus on peace enforcement rather than simply observing or verifying. A useful example is South Korea, where peace has held since the 1953 ceasefire thanks to the strong US presence there. Only the deployment of European troops with a mandate to fight back in case of a renewed aggression by Russia could preserve any potential peace arrangement. The Kremlin knows that once NATO forces are on the ground, its ambitions collapse. Any attack on them could risk war with NATO, a war Russia understands it cannot win.
Such steps would send an unmistakable signal that Europe can lead instead of merely following Donald Trump’s impulses. Passivity only confirms Putin’s belief that Europeans are too weak and complacent to act. Former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles once said that “The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art.” Europe must come to terms with this reality or accept a future shaped by Moscow’s aggression and endless blackmailing.
Juraj Majcin is a Policy Analyst with the Europe in the World Programme at the European Policy Centre.
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