Before the summer I wrote in response to re-emerging discussions on the future of the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS). I argued it was unhelpful to have the EU’s unfinished internal business surface. Instead, the focus should be on what the Union and its member states actually can and have achieved together, and on facing an increasingly dangerous reality on the European continent.
As a think tanker, I have to admit impact failure. I have not managed to nip the discussion over the EEAS in the bud. No surprise, given Brussels’ penchant for political drama. This one has many ingredients for a successful story: two powerful member states allegedly floating far-reaching ideas for a reform feeding institutional rivalry, competition between the Commission and the EEAS over who holds the pen on an upcoming security strategy, and leaders fighting over power and resources.
None of this really matters. What matters is the context in which these discussions have resurfaced: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its intensified hybrid attacks against EU member states and a policy shift in the United States on Europe likely to continue beyond the current US administration. How to best rally European sources of power behind keeping Europeans safe and free is the most existential and pressing matter, and the EU has a key role to play.
Against this backdrop, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s latest State of the Union speech offered a window into the Commission’s thinking ahead of the upcoming EU Security Strategy. Following the first ever strategy led by Javier Solana in 2003, Federica Mogherini’s 2016 Global Strategy and Josep Borrell’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence of 2022, the 2026 Strategy will have a fundamentally different context, and will not be attributed to the High Representative, but to von der Leyen herself.
While the strategy is likely to take a broad approach to security, the proposals floated in the speech on shaping European political consensus on security are worth highlighting. Von der Leyen articulated her commitment to a European Security Council, the ambition to craft an equivalent to NATO’s Article 4, and a playbook on how to deal with hybrid attacks on the Union.
Von der Leyen underlined that all these proposals are complementary to NATO. And yet, European capitals will have told their teams in Brussels to keep an even firmer eye on the final discussion rounds until the strategy is adopted. There is a fine line between endorsing the EU’s key contributions to European security while Europeanising NATO, as has been consensus, and architectural and procedural proposals that for some might come too early or send potentially counterproductive signals over the Atlantic. It is no secret that Trump despises the EU.
Von der Leyen is serving the interests of member states. Who but the European Commission can make such proposals now? National capitals have limited breathing space to table institutional proposals on security, as these could be interpreted as turning away from NATO – the last signal Europeans want to send right now. Capitals know about the political fragility of an Alliance where the need for sudden and far-reaching decisions might hinge on mood swings in the White House, and their resolve is being tested almost daily by the Russian aggressor.
Von der Leyen is serving capitals by widening Europe’s options. True, member states are far from placing their power behind the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual assistance clause as a ‘replacement’ for NATO’s Article 5. Von der Leyen’s suggestion to consider a consultation mechanism similar to NATO’s Article 4 cannot and should not compete with what NATO already has.
Thinking through ‘what if’ scenarios for a European-only context is certainly helpful and even required. The EU is not starting from scratch but from a relevant joined treaty base for security and defence. This is precisely the moment to widen Europe’s options, to have choices when needed. This is relevant to the increasing covert acts of aggression by Russia against EU member states. In this grey area below the threshold of NATO’s Article 5, a NATO-like European consultation mechanism will be useful and can help Europeans to politically align on responses, even if they are only by a group of European countries.
Having said that, the EU should also prepare for a possible armed attack and consider its responses. For the EU, any armed attack on its territory constitutes a severe stress test of its unity and solidarity. In NATO language, such scenarios are about the European ‘theatre’, with transatlantic geography implying distance. For Europeans, this is their immediate geography and daily reality. If the EU does not stick together when one or several of its members are under attack, it is unlikely to prevail long term. Therefore, the EU must actively help shape the European political consensus and unity that will be key in such severe crises.
The new Security Strategy is an opportunity to develop a wider understanding of security that fits the needs of the European continent at a time of profound change; that maps Europe’s collective resources and mechanisms and aligns on those still to be developed; and that brings them together in a short, comprehensive document. The new Security Strategy will best serve the EU and its members if it helps shape consensus around a joint understanding of the future of European security, if it clarifies the role of the Union and its policies, and if it maps the significant sources of power that the Union brings to the table.
Almut Möller is Director for European and Global Affairs and head of the Europe in the World programme at the EPC.
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