On 16 September, the US House of Representatives passed one of the most consequential Russia-related bills since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act passed by 262 votes to 159 and now heads to President Trump’s desk.
The bill aims to increase the cost of Russia’s war by targeting Russian officials, financial institutions, energy and defence companies, Russian goods, and vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet, which Moscow uses to evade sanctions.
Crucially, it authorises the president to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries that continue purchasing large quantities of Russian oil or gas under specified conditions. This could put countries such as China and India in Washington’s crosshairs, making trade with Russia much costlier for third countries.
Turning up the Pressure on Moscow
Western sanctions and Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes have severely squeezed the Russian economy. Its federal budget deficit reached 5.7 trillion rubles in the first half of 2026, exceeding the entire 2025 deficit, amid weaker energy revenues and sanctions-related pressures. Yet Moscow has stayed afloat, largely by continuing to sell vast quantities of oil and gas.
If implemented seriously, the legislation targets this lifeline. It will not automatically impose 100% tariffs, nor would a House vote instantly shut down Russian oil exports. The Treasury and other US agencies must first implement the sanctions, while the administration decides how aggressively to use its new powers. Importantly, the authority is flexible: Trump could start below the 100% ceiling and raise tariffs over time, using higher duties as leverage over major Russian energy buyers.
Trump has indicated he intends to sign the bill. However, his history of flip-flopping and even reversing positions makes the coming weeks decisive.
Even under high US tariffs, China or India may continue buying Russian oil, if Moscow offers deeper discounts or shifts trade through non-Western financial and shipping networks. The bill can increase pressure, but is unlikely to trigger an immediate collapse in Russian exports. It also carries risks for Washington: punitive tariffs on India could strain Washington’s complicated ties with New Delhi at a time when cooperation on defence, technology, and balancing China in the Indo-Pacific has deepened. India is likely to resist measures it sees as infringing on its strategic autonomy or energy security, forcing Washington to balance pressure on Moscow with the broader value of its partnership with India.
Russia’s growing economic and fiscal vulnerabilities present an opportunity to unite international efforts and intensify sanctions. For the EU, the bill could add momentum to strengthen sanctions enforcement and accelerate the phase-out of Russian fossil fuels.
For Ukraine, squeezing Russia’s energy revenues is about more than economics: it tests whether the West is ready to target the financial foundations of Putin’s war machine. Every dollar removed from Moscow’s war chest can make it harder to sustain the campaign against Ukraine. If implemented seriously, the bill could raise the strategic cost of aggression and reinforce Ukraine’s central argument: if Putin refuses to end the war, the economic price must keep rising.
Amanda Paul, Deputy Head of Europe in the World Programme and Senior Policy Analyst
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