European leaders have dodged a bullet by ensuring that Ukraine will not be left without funding in early 2026. From a technocratic perspective, the solution reached through enhanced cooperation within the EU works. It serves the interests of participating states and preserves a degree of internal cohesion, even if not all member states are on board.
Belgium got what it wanted by avoiding any move on frozen Russian assets, despite the fact that the legal risk of successful Russian retaliation through arbitration remains low. Germany showed that it can be flexible on joint borrowing when it suits its interests. Familiar naysayers such as Hungary, Slovakia and now also the Czech Republic were sidelined by allowing them to opt out.
Yet in geopolitical terms, Europe failed a crucial test. By refusing to use its strongest leverage, it projected caution rather than resolve. Once again, the EU demonstrated that its decision-making system struggles to deliver fast and bold action against a state that has launched a war of aggression and openly signals far broader ambitions to reshape Europe’s security order.
Using frozen Russian assets to back the loan would not only have secured Ukraine’s finances, which was achieved anyway, but would also have imposed greater costs on the Kremlin. It would have sent a clear message that Europe is prepared to act with power, not just prudence.
Europe also sent the wrong signal to Washington. By avoiding a decision on assets held on its own territory, Brussels leaves room for the United States to advance proposals involving those assets without consulting Europeans.
Juraj Majcin is a Policy Analyst with the European Policy Centre (EPC).
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