The unravelling of the EU coalition that never was
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen overcame her first motion of censure in the European Parliament (EP) on 10 July, by 360 votes against 175. This was widely expected, because far-right MEPS backed the motion and it needed a 2/3 majority to pass. However, the vote and the debate that preceded it in the EP will have a lasting impact on the relations between von der Leyen and the MEPs, as well as on EU priorities.
The so-called ‘von der Leyen’ coalition, supposedly composed of her European People's Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, the centrist Renew Europe (RE) and the Greens – i.e. the groups that supported her election for a second term in July 2024 - was from the start an inconsistent grouping. It is bound only by a vague “Platform Cooperation Statement”, which was signed (but not by the Greens) months later to unblock the confirmation of the commissioners, held up by partisan manoeuvring.
Meanwhile, the EPP has built an alternative majority with the ECR and parts of the far-right Patriots for Europe (PfE) to secure majorities on a case-by-case basis on issues like climate, migration or the funding of NGOs. The motion of censure debate on 7 July revealed how deep the divisions within this ‘coalition’ are, and how little von der Leyen seems concerned.
The S&D, RE and the Greens bemoan the Commission’s backtracking on the Green Deal and increasing political alignment with right-wing parties. But to S&D’s leader Iratxe García asking her: “To whom do you owe your support? Where is the compromise that gave you the pro-European majority to chair the Commission?”, the Commission president referred to the rise of right-wing parties and stated that “the answer can never be to complain about how people voted”.
Ursula von der Leyen can carry on, but this plenary week has left an even more fragmented and less stable EP. This will have an impact on the legislative work, with the disgruntled groups likely more inclined to stick to their positions, and compromises more challenging to achieve. The EPP will likely continue to navigate between the two possible majorities in the EP – the ‘von der Leyen’ one and the alternative, right-wing one. It will also likely use its dominant position in the EP, the Commission, and the European Council further to shift the EU’s agenda to the right.
More generally, the unravelling of the pro-European coalition will weaken even further the system of the Spitzenkandidat, which was supposed to make the Commission more accountable to the parliamentary majority that elects its president. The lack of agreement on the EU’s priorities among the main political families may also increase the uncertainties over the future of EU policies, with both an economic and a democratic cost. It may also make the discussions on the next Multiannual Financial Framework even more difficult, at the risk of making the EU unable to do what is necessary to face the massive challenges ahead.
Eric Maurice is a Policy Analyst in the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.
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