Three leaders, one message: Europe is on its own
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s back-to-back summits with US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin were less about diplomatic breakthroughs than about sketching the outline of a changing international order. The message was unmistakable: great powers are returning to hard transactional bargaining, carving out spheres of influence and cooperating only when it suits them.
Trump came to Beijing seeking stabilisation, not the usual confrontations. The outcome was modest but revealing. No grand bargain emerged, yet both sides made clear they would rather manage tensions than allow them to spiral. Xi offered optics of a new framework of engagement, “a constructive relationship of strategic stability”, Trump claimed tactical wins. Ultimately, the substance mattered less than choreography. Neither side can impose its will on the other: both possess sufficient economic and geopolitical leverage to inflict serious damage on the other, but neither can do so without bearing significant costs. What emerged was a fragile equilibrium that Washington and Beijing appear willing to preserve in the short term. An understanding which remains preferable for Europe to a path of open confrontation.
This however, should not delay the need to make hard choices. For EU policymakers, the current détente offers a good breathing space, but it should not create the illusion that the underlying rivarly between the US and China has become any less a structural feature of today’s world.
Putin’s subsequent visit completed the picture. Xi demonstrated that China can simultaneously engage the US while deepening ties with Russia. The carefully staged sequence reinforced Beijing’s central geopolitical position. China is no longer balancing between blocs but positioning itself at the centre. For Brussels, this is the real strategic warning.
For years, the EU has talked about becoming a “geopolitical actor”, yet the Beijing summits exposed how absent EUrope remains from the world’s decisive negotiations, where powerful leaders cut deals face-to-face. Neither Trump nor Xi sees the EU as indispensable to managing the global order. Worse still, China may now see little incentive to make concessions to the EU so long as its relationship with Washington remains manageable. Yet for Brussels, maintaining the status quo with Beijing is becoming increasingly untenable.
Sino-European relations are not static; they are gradually deteriorating under the weight of trade imbalances and political distrust. EUrope therefore risks finding itself trapped between growing dependence on China and the US and declining influence over either of them. For Brussels, the danger is not irrelevance overnight, but the gradual marginalisation disguised as stability. In this context, it can either wait for some version of the old order to re-emerge or build the power and political will needed to earn its seat at the negotiating table.
Ivano di Carlo is a Senior Policy Analyst at the EPC.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
